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I. INTRODUCTION
In the Centro de Justicia in San Miguel, a working class suburb in
southern Santiago, Chile's capital city, stand a number of new buildings,
many of which feature courtrooms, detention facilities, and lawyers'
offices. At the entrance of each building is an information kiosk, and at
each kiosk sits a stack of comic books from a series called El Juicio y la
Verdad (The Trial and the Truth) featuring the two titles El Estado
Caperucita Roja y el Lobo (The State and Little Red Riding Hood
against the Wolf) and El Estado Blanca Nieves & la Reina (The State
and Snow White vs. the Queen). In the comic, the Big Bad Wolf is tried
in a court that utilizes new criminal procedures that were implemented in
Santiago in June 2005. On the back of the comic book, beside the logo
for the Chilean Ministry of Justice, is the logo of the German Agency for
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would like to thank Professors William Aceves, Thomas Barton, Dino Kritsiotis, and John Noyes
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Technical Cooperation (GTZ),' which developed and produced the comic
book.
One and a half hours away by automobile lies the port city of Valpa-
raiso. At the police station near the port, a cardboard model of a house
rests beside the intake desk of the Carabineros, the national police. The
model, "La Casa de la Justicia," is assembled like a toy model building.
It is designed as a children's game, like Chutes and Ladders, and guides
the players through the steps of a criminal proceeding in the judicial sys-
tem to which Chile has transitioned since 2000. New procedural stages,
including appearances before the Juez de Garantia and salidas alternati-
vas (alternative sentencing and diversion programs) are presented as part
of the game. Like the comic books in Santiago, "La Casa de la Justicia"
is produced by the justice project at GTZ in partnership with the Chilean
Ministry of Justice.2 Characteristically, the house boasts the same Teu-
tonic green-grey colored architecture that dots the Ninth and Tenth
regions of Chile-areas populated by Germans after the 1880s. "La Casa
de la Justicia" helps victims of crimes, witnesses, and the accused under-
stand their respective roles in the criminal legal procedure.
In 1998, GTZ began its very successful rule of law project in Chile.
It hired experts to offer alternative ideas, methodologies, curricula,
sources, training, procedures, and public education programming to in-
stitutions in the Chilean legal sector.3 This outreach began during a time
when U.S. influence among Latin America's policy-making elite
4
waned.5
1. Deutsche Gesellschaft ffir Technische Zusammenarbeit GmbH [German Agency for
Technical Cooperation] [GTZ], http://www.gtz.de/en/ (last visited May 15, 2008).
2. See GTZ Proyecto Reforma Judicial Chile [GTZ Chile Judicial Reform Project],
http://www.gtzreformajudicial.cl/ (last visited Jan. 17, 2008).
3. DEUTSCHE GESELLSCHAFT FOR TECHNISCHE ZUSAMMENARBEIT [GERMAN AGENCY
FOR TECHNICAL COOPERATION], GTZ, SCHLUSSBERICHT AN DAS BMZ: CHILE: JUSTIZREFORM
[FINAL REPORT TO THE FEDERAL MINISTRY FOR COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT: CHILE:
JUSTICE REFORM] 1 (Jan. 22, 2007) [hereinafter GTZ FINAL REPORT]. For an examination of
public diffusion around Latin America, see Mdximo Langer, Revolution in Latin American
Criminal Procedure: Diffusion of Legal Ideas from the Periphery, 55 AM. J. COMP. L. 617
(2007).
4. Snubs and Opportunities, ECONOMIST, Nov. 25, 2006, at 37; see also End of an Af-
fair?: Coolness and Misunderstanding in the Americas, ECONOMIST, Nov. 9, 2002, at 62; cf
Richard Feinberg, Letter to the Editor, Neglecting the Neighbors, FOREIGN POL'Y, July-Aug. 6,
2003, at 6-7 (describing U.S. policy as "reasonably active in Latin America in the last decade"
with most of the engagement taking place "away from the media glare" and supported by "spo-
radic top-level engagements").
5. See James Cooper, The U.S. Should Look to the South, Not the East, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIBUNE, Dec. 14, 2005, at B7; cf YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, THE
INTERNATIONALIZATION OF PALACE WARS: LAWYERS, ECONOMISTS AND THE CONTEST TO
TRANSFORM LATIN AMERICAN STATES 6 (2002) (noting that "the relative power of Europe has
declined [and l]aw is now involved in a competition between Europe and the United States, with
the United States gaining influence" and developing a positive social analysis of how law relates
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Latin American countries, historically within the United States'
sphere of influence since gaining their independence from Europe,
have come, once again, under the influence of Europe. A case in point
is the increasing role that German legal culture has played in influenc-
ing legal culture6 and promoting legal reform efforts in Chile. As
Washington, D.C., has pursued other foreign policy objectives outside
• 7
of the Western Hemisphere, the resulting vacuum has been filled by
Germany-and, at times, by France, Spain, and other Member States of
the European Union.
European investors have also aggressively pursued business
development in Latin America.8 In 2005, the European Union
announced that it was "the leading foreign investor in Latin America,
the leading donor to the region, and the leading trading partner of many
Latin American countries, particularly those countries in the
to the field of state power and its reproduction and transformation over time); see generally
Marcus J. Kurtz, The Dilemmas of Democracy in the Open Economy: Lessons from Latin
America, 56 WORLD POL. 262 (2004).
6. See Richard J. Wilson, Three Law School Clinics in Chile, 1970-2000: Innovation,
Resistance and Conformity in the Global South, 8 CLINICAL L. REV. 515, 520-23 (2002) (exam-
ining Chilean legal culture); see also ENRIQUE BARROS ET AL., LA CULTURA JURfDICA CHILENA
[CHILEAN LEGAL CULTURE] (Agustin Squella ed., 1988); JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL
LAW TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF WESTERN EUROPE AND LATIN
AMERICA (2d ed. 1985); CARLOS PE&A ET AL., EVOLUCI6N DE LA CULTURA JUR1DICA CHILENA
[EVOLUTION OF THE CHILEAN LEGAL CULTURE] (Agustin Squella ed., 1994).
7. See Snubs and Opportunities, supra note 4, at 37 (noting that "Latin Americans dislike
George Bush because of the war in Iraq and what they perceive, fairly or not, to be his high-
handed neglect of their region"); see generally ANDRES OPPENHEIMER, SAVING THE AMERICAS:
THE DANGEROUS DECLINE OF LATIN AMERICA AND WHAT THE U.S. MUST Do (2007); Mi-
CHAEL REID, FORGOTTEN CONTINENT: THE BATTLE FOR LATIN AMERICA'S SOUL (2007).
8. See Ludger Volmer, Minister of State (F.R.G.), Speech at the Centro Brasileiro de
Relagbes Internacionais (CEBRI) in Rio de Janeiro (Mar. 21, 2001), available
at http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/en/Infoservice/PresseRede/Archiv/2001/01032 1-
BrazilandLatinamericaPDF.pdf. In his speech, Volmer explained that "European
investments have increased tenfold since the beginning of the nineties .... Even today
Europe is the most important investor in the south of Latin America--even ahead of the
[United States]." Id.; see also Raymond Collitt, Repsol Pours Money into Latin America Oil
and Gas, FIN. TIMES (London), Aug. 4, 2000, at 26; Geoff Dyer, Telefonica to Invest
Dollars 3.8bn in Brazil, FIN. TIMES (London), Nov. 27, 1998, at 32; Keith Johnson, Spain
Emerges as M&A Powerhouse, WALL ST. J., Sept. 26, 2006, at A6; Bob Storck, Upgrade in
Mexico; VW to Give Puebla Plant $1 Billion Overhaul, AUTOMOTIVE NEWS EUR., Aug. 14,
2000, at 15 (discussing Volkswagen AG's plan to refurbish the oldest of its Latin American
assembly plants); Benita Ferrero-Waldner, European Commissioner for External Relations
and European Neighbourhood Policy, Speech before the EU-LAC Business Summit: The
EU and Latin America: Reenergizing a Strategic Partnership, Making Business Work, (May
12, 2006), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/
06/293&format=HTML&aged=1 &language=EN&guiLanguage=en.
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MERCOSUR trade group."9 The European Union has also constructed
bilateral and multilateral assistance agreements and free trade pacts. '°
With these developments comes increased European soft power."
When the European Union enlarged from fifteen to twenty-five
Member States in 2004, its population grew to 729 million people.
With more market power comes more influence:
The new United States of Europe-to use Winston Churchill's
phrase-has more people, more wealth, and more trade than
the United States of America. The New Europe cannot match
[U.S.] military strength (and doesn't want to, for that matter).
But it has more votes in every international organization than
the United States, and it gives away far more money in devel-
opment aid. The result is global economic and political clout
that makes the European Union exactly what its leaders want it
to be: a second superpower that can stand on equal footing
with the United States.
12
Much scholarship'3  and media speculation 14  have addressed
the battle over which worldview-that of the United States or that
of the E.U. Member States'-will come to dominate international
business, foreign relations, the war on terror,' 6 and international
9. Press Release, European Union, Latin America: The Commission Renews Its Strategy,
IP/05/1555 (Dec. 9, 2005), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?
reference=lP/05/1555&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en.
10. See Commission Proposal for a Council Decision Concerning the Conclusion of the
Economic Partnership, Political Coordination and Cooperation Agreement Between the Euro-
pean Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the United Mexican States, of the
other part, 1997 O.J. (C 350) 6 (EC); see also European Community-MERCOSUR: Interregional
Framework Agreement on Cooperation, Dec. 15, 1995, 1996 BDIEL AD LEXIS 11; IV EU-
LAC Summit, 2, May 12, 2006 (promising expanded and deepened cooperation between
Europe and Latin America and the Caribbean, built on "mutual respect, equality, and solidarity").
11. For an examination of soft power, see generally JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., THE PARADOX OF
AMERICAN POWER: WHY THE WORLD'S ONLY SUPERPOWER CAN'T Go IT ALONE 8-12 (2002).
12. T.R. REID, THE UNITED STATES OF EUROPE: THE NEW SUPERPOWER AND THE END
OF AMERICAN SUPREMACY 1 (2004) (exploring the ways in which the European Union is posi-
tioning itself to be a global counterweight and second superpower on equal footing with the
United States).
13. See, e.g., ROBERT KAGAN, OF PARADISE AND POWER (2003) (discussing the contrast-
ing approaches taken by the United States and Europe to foreign relations, with the United States
continuing to exercise power while Europe moves away from power toward laws and rules).
14. Eugenio Tironi, Nos han mentido [They have lied to us], EL MERCURIO, May 2, 2006,
at A3 ("La guerra ideological o propagandfstica entre el modelo americano y el modelo europeo
no tiene nada que envidiarle a la Guerra Fria entre el capitalismo y el comunismo.").
15. See DENNIS L. BARK, AMERICANS AND EUROPEANS DANCING IN THE DARK: ON OUR
DIFFERENCES AND AFFINITIES, OUR INTERESTS AND OUR HABITS OF LIFE 1 (2007) (finding that
"[o]ne of the few things that Europeans and Americans do agree on is that we are drifting apart").
16. Mark Landler, German Court Challenges C.I.A. Over Abduction, N.Y TIMES, Feb. 1,
2007, at Al; see also BARK, supra note 15, at 209 (noting that the beginning of the war in Iraq, in
[Vol. 29:501
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rule-making.17 This struggle plays out in international bodies, dispute
resolution fora,"5 and developing countries as they adopt models from
abroad.'9 As part of this beauty contest among "developed" States, the
countries' respective legal cultures compete to influence "developing"
States as well as other "developed" States.20 European legal culture,2'
like U.S. legal culture, influences the development of norms, rules,
and institutions in other countries.22 The exporting of legal culture is
part of the foreign policy and development assistance agendas of
Europe and the United States, especially as the world becomes more
interconnected economically, politically, and socially.23 In particular,
German legal culture, like German political power, has become an
March of 2003, was not the starting point for the debate between the United States and "Old
Europe," but rather had already "moved on to the level of concluding statements").
17. ROCKWELL A. SCHNABEL & FRANCIS X. ROCCA, THE NEXT SUPERPOWER? xxi-xxii
(2005) (announcing that the European Union has recently "reached a crossroads, where it must
choose between liberalizing its economy or pursuing the dirigiste policies that have held back
growth in some of its largest members, and between enhancing its historic alliance with the
United States or attempting to play the role of a geopolitical 'counterweight' to America").
18. DAVID PALMETER, THE WTO AS A LEGAL SYSTEM: ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL
TRADE LAW AND POLICY 338 (2003) (noting the similarity between the WTO dispute resolution
system and the U.S. federal administrative system); Raj Bhala, The Precedent Setters: De Facto
Stare Decisis in WTO Adjudication, 9 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 1, 2 (1999).
19. According to Thomas Carothers, there has been
an explosion of rule-of-law assistance all over the developing world, Eastern Europe,
and the former Soviet Union. Many other bilateral donors, as well as the World Bank
and the regional development banks, have plunged into the field. At least in some
countries, the new consensus on the importance of the rule-of-law aid produces con-
gestion on the ground.
THOMAS CAROTHERS, AIDING DEMOCRACY ABROAD 165 (1999). This observed trend mirrors
what occurred in economic assistance: "[T]o date almost all of the influential foreign consultants
in Eastern Europe have been neo-classical economists. Their ethnocentric-largely U.S.-
prescriptions are given lip service and only a few genuine attempts at implementation." Paul H.
Brietzke, Designing the Legal Framework for Markets in Eastern Europe, in EUROPEAN LEGAL
CULTURES 485, 485 (Volkmar Gessner, Armin Hoeland & Csaba Varga eds., 1996).
20. See John C. Reitz, Export of the Rule of Law, 13 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
429 (2003) (discussing the politics of exporting the rule of law, different attempts by different
countries, and strategies); see also Jon Mills, Principles for Constitutions and Institutions in
Promoting the Rule of Law, 16 FLA. J. INT'L L. 115 (2004).
21. See Franz Wieacker, Foundations of European Legal Culture, in EUROPEAN LEGAL
CULTURES, supra note 19, at 49 (observing that the European legal culture is not unitary, but
rather is composed of a Continental European legal culture, an Anglo-American legal culture,
and an Eastern and Central European legal culture).
22. See R. Daniel Kelemen & Eric C. Sibbitt, The Globalization of American Law, 58
INT'L ORG. 103 (2004).
23. See Robert Kagan & Lee Alexrad, Adversarial Legalism: An International Perspec-
tive, in COMPARATIVE DISADVANTAGES? SOCIAL REGULATIONS AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 146,
146-80 (Pietro Nivola ed., 1997).
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engine of influence for a larger European legal culture,24 business
culture,25 and social character.26
This Article explores the competition that exists between U.S. and
German legal cultures and examines Chilean legal reform efforts since
the late 1990s as a case study of this competition. A country's legal cul-
ture is comprised of the self-governing rules and operations of national
and regional bar associations, the format of legal education, the structure
of the legal and judicial profession, the role of the judiciary, jurispruden-
tial style, and the reputation of the legal sector according to the general
public. The influence of predominant legal cultures on developing na-
tions has been explored in a number of contexts,29 while the importance
24. Commentators have also noted that
[i]f we ignore the legal-historical and cultural-historical similarities-which may be
described as forming a "European legal culture" only at the expense of a high degree
of abstraction and which in fact can only be recognized as a cultural unity when
contrasted to other legal cultures-we can proceed on the assumption that in the
European Union a practically common legal culture is also developing, but that this
process is still far from having attained a solid level of common interpretive patterns
and routines with respect to the law.
Volkmar Gessner, Armin Hoeland & Csaba Varga, Introduction: National Legal Orders Without a
European Legal Culture?, in EUROPEAN LEGAL CULTURES, supra note 19, at 493, 493-94 (cita-
tion omitted) (emphasis in original).
25. See Kenneth Dyson, Cultural Issues and the Single European Market: Barriers to
Trade and Shifting Attitudes, in EUROPEAN LEGAL CULTURES, supra note 19, at 387, 387-90
(noting the impact German legal culture had within the European Community, which was much
stronger than the impact of either of the U.S. or Japanese models).
26. See, e.g., Robert Malzacher, Industrie- und Handelskammern: Deutsch-
Franzbsische Achse erneuem [Chambers of Commerce and Industry: Renew the German-
French Axis] (2003), http://www.giessen-friedberg.ihk.de/Geschaeftsbereiche/Intemational/
EuropaNews/2003/IHKDeutsch-Franz-Achseemeuem.jsp?reloadscoolmenus (last visited
Mar. 11, 2008). Germany has the largest population in the European Union and has the largest
percentage of seats in the European Parliament. See lhre Abgeordneten: Land und Fraktion [Your
MEPs: By Country and Political Group], http://www.europarl.europa.eulmembers/expert/
groupAndCountry.do?language=DE (last visited Mar. 11, 2008).
27. For other comparisons in U.S. and European approaches to legal issues, see generally
Christopher Slobogin, An Empirically Based Comparison of American and European Regulatory
Approaches to Police Investigation, in ADVERSARIAL VERSUS INQUISITORIAL JUSTICE: PSYCHO-
LOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS 27 (Peter J. Van Koppen & Steven D.
Penrod eds., 2003).
28. Roger Cotterrell, Is There a Logic of Legal Transplants?, in ADAPTING LEGAL CUL-
TURES 71, 78 (David Nelken & Johannes Feest eds., 2001) (noting that "[lI]egal culture may be
seen as a discourse with its own internal dynamics and structure, also having complex relations
with other cultural components of the environment (for example, relating to trust and distrusts as
bases of economic organization)"); Lawrence M. Friedman & Rogelio P6rez-Perdomo, Latin
Legal Cultures in the Age of Globalization, in LEGAL CULTURE IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION:
LATIN AMERICA AND LATIN EUROPE 1, 2 (Lawrence M. Friedman & Rogelio P6rez-Perdomo
eds., 2003) (stating that legal culture refers to "the cluster of attitudes, ideas, expectations, and
values that people hold with regard to their legal system, legal institutions, and legal rules").
29. MIRIAM AzIz, THE IMPACT OF EUROPEAN RIGHTS ON NATIONAL LEGAL CULTURES
30 (2004) (contending that "the 'market mentality' of the European Court of Justice is a notice-
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of fostering an effective legal culture has been noted in clinical legal
education30 and in legal practice.' While some legal cultures reflect na-
tional borders,32 others are religiously based and separate from the
sovereign State and national bar associations.33 Legal culture has played
as significant a part in the national development of the United States34 as
it has in the histories of Chile and Germany.35 This Article compares the
manner in which U.S. and German legal cultures have been exported or
transplanted to Chile.36
able part of its rights jurisprudence"); MARY SARAH BILDER, THE TRANSATLANTIC CONSTITU-
TION: COLONIAL LEGAL CULTURE AND THE EMPIRE 7 (2004) (providing an examination of
imported legal literature in colonial Rhode Island); see generally LEGAL CULTURE AND THE
LEGAL PROFESSION (Lawrence M. Friedman & Harry N. Scheiber eds., 1996).
30. Andrea Seielstad, Unwritten Laws and Customs, Local Legal Cultures, and Clinical
Legal Education, 6 CLINICAL L. REV. 127, 172 (1999).
31. Lynn M. LoPucki, Legal Culture, Legal Strategy, and the Law in Lawyers'Heads, 90
Nw. U. L. REV. 1498, 1509 (1996).
32. See generally ERHARD BLANKENBURG & FREEK BRUINSMA, DUTCH LEGAL CULTURE
(2d ed. 1994) (providing a descriptive overview of the Dutch legal system); Peter J. Van Koppen
& Steven D. Penrod, Adversarial or Inquisitorial: Comparing Systems, in ADVERSARIAL VERSUS
INQUISITORIAL JUSTICE, supra note 27, at 1, 1-19 (identifying the differences in criminal proce-
dures between the United States and the Netherlands). The authors specifically explain that
"[e]ach national system is also a moving target that keeps on changing all the time, both in prac-
tice and law." Van Koppen & Penrod, supra, at 2; see also CHARLOTTE VILLERS, THE SPANISH
LEGAL TRADITION (1999); Peter A. Joy et aL, Building Clinical Legal Education Programs in a
Country Without a Tradition of Graduate Professional Legal Education: Japan Educational
Reform as a Case Study, 13 CLINICAL L. REV. 417, 453 (2006) (examining Japan's legal culture).
33. See Asifa Quraishi, Interpreting the Qur'an and the Constitution: Similarities in the
Uses of Text, Tradition, and Reason in Islamic and American Jurisprudence, 28 CARDOZO L.
REV. 67 (2006) (exploring how the Koran can be used to interpret the U.S. Constitution).
34. See Gregory S. Alexander, Time and Property in the American Republican Legal Cul-
ture, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 273 (1991) (describing the successful expansion, over opposition, of new
forms of intangible property in Great Britain and the United States); Maxwell Bloomfield, David
Hoffman and the Shaping of a Republican Legal Culture, 38 MD. L. REV. 673, 684 (1979); see
also ROBERT KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW (2001); Paul
Finkelman, Baseball and the Rule of Law, 46 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 239, 239 (1998) (attributing
American "legal culture" and perhaps even "the very rule of law itself in the United States ... to
our national past time").
35. See generally LEGAL CULTURE IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION, supra note 28 (ex-
plaining how the legal systems of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Puerto Rico,
Venezuela, France, Italy, and Spain changed in the last quarter of the twentieth century and how
these changes relate to the political and social histories in which they are embedded); see also
Robert Kagan, Comparing National Styles of Regulation in Japan and the U.S., 22 LAW & POL'Y
225 (2000) (exploring the relationship between U.S. and Japanese regulations); Robert Kagan,
Should Europe Worry about Adversarial Legalism?, 17 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 165 (1997).
36. See Van Koppen & Penrod, supra note 32, at 2. Van Koppen and Perod state,
Comparing criminal justice systems is like shooting rabbits on a fair: you always
shoot too high or too low, you always hit another rabbit than the one you were aiming
at .... Each national system is also a moving target that keeps on changing all the
time, both in practice and in law. And, all these systems differ in so many respects,
that a systems-wide comparison is foolhardy.
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In the last few years, the globalization process, with its bent on legal
harmonization, has fomented an even greater competition between legal
cultures.37 Europe and the United States have competed over whose rules
will be adopted around the globe.38 This is the phenomenon that Yves
Dezalay and Bryant Garth call "the setting of the transnational rules of
the game. '39 The contest affects, among other areas, corporate compli-
ance in the wake of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,40 science and rule-making
concerning food safety, the development of product liability regimes,'
and decisions of the International Standards Organization. 2
Id.; see also David Nelken, Towards a Sociology of Legal Adaptation, in ADAPTING LEGAL CUL-
TURES, supra note 28, at 7, 25 (noting that the primary reason "for resorting to the concept of
legal culture is the way it reminds us that aspects of law normally come in 'packages' of one sort
or another").
37. Lawrence M. Friedman, Sociology of Transnational Law, 32 STAN. J. INT'L L. 65, 77
(1996) (asserting that the driving force behind convergence is the global economy, which also
"stimulates jurists to draft model laws and to worry about harmonization"); see also GLOBALISA-
TION AND RESISTANCE: LAW REFORM IN ASIA SINCE THE CRISIS (Christoph Antons & Wolkmar
Gessner eds., 2007).
38. For Professor William Twining,
[R]ules are not the only, nor even the main, phenomena that are transplanted; that the
reception of 'lawyers' law' and legal techniques is less problematic than matters that
are closed related to local mores or political issues of the day; and that the main agents
of reception of law as technology are the legal honoratoires, Weber's ironic term for
the dominant legal elite.
WILLIAM TVINING, GLOBALISATION & LEGAL THEORY 144 (2000); see also William Twining,
Some Aspects of Reception, SUDAN L.J. & REP. 229 (1957).
39. Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth, Legitimating the New Legal Orthodoxy, in GLOBAL
PRESCRIPTIONS: THE PRODUCTION, EXPORTATION, AND IMPORTATION OF A NEw LEGAL ORTHO-
DoxY 306, 307 (Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth eds., 2002).
40. See William A. Niskanen, Enron's Last Victim: American Markets, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3,
2007, at A23 (explaining that "Sarbanes-Oxley has seriously harmed American corporations and
financial markets without increasing investor confidence"); see also Silvia Ascarelli, Citing Sar-
banes, Foreign Companies Flee U.S. Exchanges, WALL. ST. J., Sept. 20, 2004, at Cl; James M.
Cooper, Seen and Not Seen: System Friction and the Battle Over Corporate Governance, in
TRENDS IN WORLD TRADE POLICY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF SYLVIA OSTRY (Alan S. Alexandroff ed.,
2007).
41. See Boris Kozolchyk, Foreword: Symposium-Products Liability in Latin America, 20
ARiz. J. INT'L & CoMp. L. vii (2003). Kozolchyk states,
Approximately two decades after the first product liability decisions were handed
down by United States courts and the Restatement of the Law of Torts (Second) was
published by the American Law Institute, Latin American commentators, especially in
Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay, began to develop a Latin American law of
product liability. Soon thereafter, Latin American courts started to hand down their
first products liability decisions. These writings and decisions were not carbon copies
of their United States counterparts. Given the affiliation of Latin American law with
European civil law, Latin American doctrinal comments and court decisions bore the
visible influence of French, German, and Italian writers.
Id.
42. Peter A. Gourevitch, The Macropolitics of Microinstitutional Differences in the Analy-
sis of Comparative Capitalism, in NATIONAL DIVERSITY AND GLOBAL CAPITALISM 239, 241
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This competition among legal cultures is important for four reasons.
First, the champion will likely dictate the rules of international institu-
41tions. As international organizations increasingly regulate the world, a
country's preeminence in an area or the adoption of its particular rule
affords that country, its lawyers, and its businesses a large advantage."
Second, the winner of the competition will dictate the rules of national
45legal systems, molding foreign legal systems to be more like its own.
International actors-both public and private-realize global economies
of scale that confer strategic advantages when dealing with regulations
46more similar to those of their home countries. Third, the champion will
benefit by means of greater advantages for its own lawyers and corpora-
tions, through economies of scale and lower transaction costs.
47
Naturally, whoever makes the rules has an inherent advantage in facili-
tating business dealings.4'8 Fourth, by training foreign lawyers, jurists,
(Suzanne Berger & Ronald Dore eds., 1996) ("The features that differentiate the internal firm
and industry organization of German, Japanese, American, French, British, Italian, Swedish,
Austrian, Korean, Taiwanese, and other market economies are institutionalized in the regulatory
systems constructed in all nations by their political systems. The regulatory system sustains the
micro-institutional patterns of the economy."); Walter Mattli & Tim Buthe, Setting International
Standards: Technological Rationality or Primacy of Power?, WORLD POL., Oct. 2003, at 1.
43. ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 8 (2004) (asserting the impor-
tance of global institutions "to solve [a variety of] collective problems that can only be
addressed on a global scale ... and through a variety of means").
44. See generally Jenny Anderson, U.S. Financial Sector is Losing Its Edge, Report
Says, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2007, at C3.
45. See Katharina Pistor, The Standardization of Law and Its Effects on Developing
Economies, 50 AM. J. CoMP. L. 97 (2002); see also Joseph Kahn, Chinese Official Warns
Against Independence of Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2007, at A5 (quoting Chinese officials
saying that "'[elnemy forces' are seeking to use China's legal system to Westernize and divide
the country, and the Communist Party must fend them off by maintaining its dominance over
lawyers, judges and prosecutors").
46. See Dezalay & Garth, supra note 39, at 307 (comparing "[t]ransnational battles
about the appropriate rules of the game [to] continuations of national battles about the govern-
ance of the state and economy").
47. Id. at 307-08 (noting that, while not all "U.S. actors try to export a U.S. style of the
law," those who "have advanced or seek to advance in the field of state power in the United
States quite often and naturally choose to invest in the law").
48. It is true of U.S. influence as well. See Paul W. Drake, Introduction: The Political
Economy of Foreign Advisors and Lenders in Latin America, in MONEY DOCTORS, FOREIGN
DEBTS, AND ECONOMIC REFORMS IN LATIN AMERICA FROM THE 1890s TO THE PRESENT Xi, Xix
(Paul W. Drake ed., 1994). Drake states,
Ever since the 1890s, Washington has recognized that nearly all U.S. advisers hired
overseas can further its economic and strategic interests. However indirectly, U.S.
health experts can induce foreigners to purchase U.S. drugs and medical equipment,
military trainers can inspire them to buy U.S. arms and doctrines, agronomists to pre-
fer U.S. seeds and farm machinery, engineers to favor U.S. construction firms and
automobiles, artists to consume U.S. entertainment, educators to assign U.S. text-
books, and intellectuals to imbibe U.S. ideas. No matter how scientific, professional
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and law enforcement officers, the society that wins this contest will fur-
ther strengthen practices and values that promote the legal culture49 at
home.5
From the Ten Commandments, Rome's ius gentium," the Justinian
Code, Papal Encyclicals, and the Napoleonic Code to, more recently,
corporate governance and insider trading regulations, legal models have
long been exported to new jurisdictions from those in which they were
created.52 The legal transplantation process has helped developing coun-
tries emerge from dictatorships and economic chaos to build new
institutions and transform themselves. 3
Part II of this Article first examines why developed countries have
focused on the legal sector of other developing countries and how aid
and technical assistance facilitate the migration of legal cultures.54 Early
reform work often focuses on the economy, paving the way for free mar-
and altruistic the agents, their presence has usually encouraged the adoption of the
technologies, systems, products, and beliefs of the United States.
Id.
49. Examples are Siemens AG prison products or Lexis-Nexis legal publications. See
generally Jacqueline E. Ross, The Place of Covert Surveillance in Democratic Societies: A
Comparative Study of the United States and Germany, 55 AM. J. COMP. L. 493 (2007).
50. Rachel Sieder, Line Schjolden & Alan Angell, Introduction, in THE JUDICIALIZATION
OF POLITICS IN LATIN AMERICA 13 (Rachel Sieder, Line Schjolden & Alan Angell eds., 2005)
(asserting the importance of internal training of lawyers, judges, and public prosecutors).
51. BARRY NICHOLAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW 54 (1962).
52. ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW 19 (2d
ed. 1993) (describing "legal transplants" as "the moving of a rule or a system of law from one
country to another, or from one people to another"); see also JAMES A. GARDNER, LEGAL
IMPERIALISM: AMERICAN LAWYERS AND FOREIGN AID IN LATIN AMERICA 29 (1980) (arguing
that "notions of transferring law and legal system are probably as old as international com-
merce, domination, and interpenetration generally); Terence C. Halliday & Lucien Karpik,
Postscript: Lawyers, Political Liberalism and Globalization, in LAWYERS AND THE RISE OF
WESTERN POLITICAL LIBERALISM 350 (Terence C. Halliday & Lucien Karpik eds., 1997) (ob-
serving that "[tlransnational movements of people, commerce, ideas, institutions, and laws are
hardly new").
53. See Stephen Haber, Introduction: Institutional Change, Economic Growth, and
Economic History, in POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN LATIN AMERICA I
(Stephen Haber ed., 2000). Haber states,
There has been a revolution in the social sciences in recent years emanating from
the study of institutions in the process of economic growth. Institutions in this con-
text are understood as the laws, rules, and informal agreements within societies that
both permit and bound economic or other types of social behavior. They are not the
organizations that society are composed of (the banks, churches, factories, govern-
ments) but are the sets of rules that govern how those organizations work.
Id.
54. Sieder, Schjolden & Angell, supra note 50, at 4 (allowing that the processes "of
judicialization of politics can be driven 'from above,' 'from below,' or even, at least in part,
'from abroad').
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kets and open competition.55 Legal reform has often followed thereafter.
Part II then explores the history of legal transplantation and the manner
in which Chile in particular became such fertile ground for foreign legal
cultures to grow and, in the process, became a laboratory for many legal
reform efforts.
Part III examines the German influence on the legal system and re-
form efforts in Chile. Part IV of this Article explores the roles that the
U.S. government and other U.S. actors have played in exporting U.S.
legal culture to Chile. As the Article will demonstrate, German legal cul-
ture got quite a head start.5 6 Part V of the Article then examines the
different kinds of influences that have emanated respectively from the
United States and Germany. Part V also seeks to understand the dynam-
ics of the U.S.-European relationship in the context of efforts to
strengthen the rule of law in Chile, where there is competition, yet also
signs of some convergence. The conclusion looks at the ethics of legal
transplantation and the dangers of judicial imperialism or donor rejec-
tion.
II. FROM ECONOMIC REFORM TO LEGAL REFORM
The legal transplantation process involves, by its very nature, the
adoption of, adaptation 7 to, incorporation of, or reference to legal cul-
tures from abroad.58 Judges, along with other actors in the legal
55. See JOHN GILLESPIE, TRANSPLANTING COMMERCIAL LAW REFORM: DEVELOPING A
"RULE OF LAW" IN VIETNAM 1 (2006) (noting that after "the collapse of the Soviet bloc in the
early 1990s, global, social, economic, and political interconnections have proliferated, stimu-
lating renewed interest by large trading nations and international agencies in global legal
harmonisation").
56. CAROTHERS, supra note 19, at 8 (explaining that "[t]he recent surge of democracy
assistance is by no means exclusively or even principally a U.S. story").
57. Nelken, supra note 36, at 22 (analyzing the different ways in which legal adaptation
occurs, including imposition, planning, deliberate efforts, or through convergence or diver-
gence).
58. See GILLESPIE, supra note 55, at 3. Gillespie notes,
Legal transplantation is generally understood as the transfer of laws and institu-
tional structures across geopolitical or cultural borders. It can be imposed or
voluntary, encompass entire legal systems or single legal principles and integrate
similar or different cultures. Within host countries, legal transfers may permeate
state and non-state social institutions, or in the case of many developing countries,
reside in state law superimposed on indigenous legal structures. It is increasingly
linked to international legal harmonisation projects sponsored by large trading na-
tions and international donor agencies.
Id.; cf Cotterrell, supra note 28, at 79 (offering the opposing view that perhaps there is no
logic of legal transplants, "the concept of legal transplant itself is unclear, the matters to be
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sector-including prosecutors, justice ministry officials, judicial coun-
cils, supreme courts, law school professors, ombudspeople, and public
defenders-often look to rules, institutions, and jurisprudence from other
countries, particularly to those from similar legal traditions and Anglo-
Saxon or other legal cultures." Professor Alan Watson contends that "le-
gal transplants [are] the moving of a rule or a system of law from one
country to another, or from one people or another since the earliest re-
corded history."' For many centuries, the legal codes and legal cultures
that were established in Latin America were products of the colonial ex-
perience with Spain and Portugal.6 Prior to independence, laws were
merely imposed on the territories of the colonial powers. Spain, through
the legal culture it transplanted during colonial times, enjoyed a consis-
tent influence on the New World in the Americas.62 In the colonies, "the
Spanish judiciary was given almost no autonomy and continued to de-
pend on the Crown's scholarly-inspired statutes with limited reflection of
the principles, customs and values arising from Spain's diverse re-
,,63gions.
After independence in the early part of the nineteenth century, how-
ever, legal models from other countries like the United Kingdom and the
United States soon found receptive homes in the southern parts of theWestrn " 64
Western Hemisphere. Statutes, customs, and legal processes were
addressed are too complex, the variables are too numerous, or they remain too often insuffi-
ciently defined").
59. See, e.g., Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990 (1999) (Kennedy, J.); see also Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
60. WATSON, supra note 52, at 19; see also GARDNER, supra note 52, at 29 (declaring
that "notions of transferring law and legal systems are probably as old as international com-
merce, domination and interpenetration generally"). But see Pierre Legrand, What "Legal
Transplants"?, in ADAPTING LEGAL CULTURES, supra note 28, at 55, 63 (asserting a belief
that the idea of "legal transplants" is a fiction because "what can be displaced from one juris-
diction to another is, literally, a meaningless form of words").
61. GARDNER, supra note 52, at 30 (finding that the "legal export experience of the
European colonialists is particularly relevant and instructive").
62. See ELENA MERINO-BLANCO, THE SPANISH LEGAL SYSTEM 15-20 (1996) (describ-
ing how the influence of the Spanish philosophical movement in colonial times led to the
Spanish legal system's theoretical basis for subsequent centuries); Javier A. Couso, Tile
Changing Role of Law and Courts in Latin America: From an Obstacle to Social Change to a
Tool of Social Equity, in COURTS AND SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION IN NEW DEMOCRACIES 62
(Robert Gargarella, Pilar Domingo & Theunis Roux eds., 2006) (discussing historical legal
norms from the colonial era in Continental Europe, during which time the courts were simply
"another expression of royal power," which reached even into the remote colonies).
63. Felipe Sdez Garcia, The Nature of Judicial Reform in Latin America and Some
Strategic Considerations, 13 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1267, 1282 (1998).
64. Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor & Jean-Francois Richard, The Transplant Effect,
51 AM. J. COMp. L. 163, 167 (2003); see also M.C. MIROW, LATIN AMERICAN LAW 130
(2004). Mirow notes,
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transplanted in a wholesale fashion, themselves the product of French
influence over the codification process."
For much of the twentieth century-at least until the early 1980s-
most governments in Latin America pursued policies of economic
nationalism, including import substitution and controls on capital flows.
Latin American governments closed markets to foreign competition and
pursued state intervention.66 When these policies failed, they resulted in
economic stagnation, hyperinflation, and the erosion of living standards.67
International bond defaults in the early 1980s produced military
dictatorships and oppressive regimes simultaneously throughout Latin
The use of European code provisions, European organizational structures for law,
and European doctrine had a powerful impact on Latin American law and legal de-
velopment. Law students and lawyers tended toward an international intellectual
outlook that included training in European languages, French most of all, and read-
ily made these foreign sources their own. Furthermore, since European law
provided a great deal of intellectual framework and content of Latin American law,
further adoption and appropriation of European models and indeed European im-
provements were relatively common.
Id.
65. EDGARDO BUSCAGLIA, JR., MARIA DAKOLIAS & WILLIAM RATLIFF, JUDICIAL RE-
FORM IN LATIN AMERICA: A FRAMEWORK FOR NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 17-18 (1995). They
state,
Most of the civil law countries in Latin America achieved their independence in the
nineteenth century and one after the other they adopted civil codes that in many
cases were little more than translations of the French code. Many of these trans-
plants occurred when countries in Latin America were providing raw materials for
the second Industrial Revolution taking place in North America and Europe. The in-
frastructure and financial capital were provided by London and Paris, two of the
main financial centers at that time. Consequently, the legal systems throughout
Latin America needed to respond to the interests of the suppliers of capital and the
local producers.
Id.
66. See ALVARO VARGAS LLOSA, LIBERTY FOR LATIN AMERICA 46 (2005).
67. See Alan M. Taylor, Latin America and Foreign Capital in the Twentieth Century:
Economics, Politics, and Institutional Change, in POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC
GROWTH IN LATIN AMERICA, supra note 53, at 121, 124-25. Taylor notes,
In 1900, the Latin American income level was well above that in Asia and stood at
41 percent of the OECD core. In 1950, Latin American gross domestic product
(GDP) per capita was 45 percent of the OECD core level and more than three times
the Asian average. But by the 1980s Latin America had fallen back to less than one-
third the OECD level and was being approached and overtaken by parts of Asia.
This twentieth-century relative retardation and slump in living standards is Latin
America's burden of history and remains a central, burning issue in the region's po-
litical, social, and economic landscape.
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America. The region was ready for a change.68 In exchange for the
adoption of certain rules and regulations concerning the functioning of
markets, and some strengthening of democratic institutions, the
international financial community lent money to these nascent
democracies in an attempt to encourage a set of "neoliberal" policies-
the so-called Washington Consensus. Privatization of state assets was a
central part of the prescription. ° Deregulation, the opening of markets to
foreign competition, and the lowering of barriers to trade were also
recommended policies.7
These policies-involving the flow of capital, intellectual property,
technology, professional services, and ideas-require that disputes be
settled fairly and by a set of recognized and enforced laws.72 The rule of
law, after all, provides the infrastructure upon which democracies may
thrive, because it functions to enforce property rights and contracts.73
68. MERILEE S. GRINDLE, AUDACIOUS REFORMS: INSTITUTIONAL INVENTION AND DE-
MOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA 8 (2000) (explaining that "[i]n the decade and a half following
the economic crisis of the early 1980s, Latin American countries were a laboratory of eco-
nomic policy change and political transition").
69. See John Williamson, From Reform Agenda: A Short History of the Washington
Consensus and Suggestions for What To Do Next, FIN. & DEV., Sept. 2003, at 10. The Wash-
ington Consensus is the expression that came to explain the process of deregulation,
privatization, lowering of tariff and other trade barriers, and promotion of neo-liberal and free
market economics. The protectionist policies of past decades, like import substitution and
state-led national industrialization, were to be reversed and replaced by policies that opened
markets to international competitors, who would in turn promote economic growth invest-
ment, production, and efficiency. See Carol M. Rose, Privatization-The Road to
Democracy?, 50 ST. Louis U. L.J. 691 (2006).
70. See Alberto Chong & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, The Truth About Privatization in
Latin America, in PRIVATIZATION IN LATIN AMERICA: MYTHS AND REALITIES 1, 1 (Alberto
Chong & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes eds., 2005) (noting that "[p]rivatization efforts have
greatly stalled in recent years, however, despite worldwide evidence that points to improved
performance, firm restructuring, fiscal benefits, increased output, and quality improvements
following privatization").
71. Douglass C. North & Barry R. Weingast, Concluding Remarks: The Emerging New
Economic History of Latin America, in POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN
LATIN AMERICA, supra note 53, at 273, 282-83 (finding that although "[e]conomists have a
well-developed theory about the form of these rules to produce economic development" the
"political decisions in Latin America ... frequently bias the rules away from those that pro-
duce efficient markets").
72. See GRINDLE, supra note 68, at 10 (citing DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS,
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1990)) (explaining that "institutions
such as property rights and contracts, and such regimes as legal system and government poli-
cies, are understood to evolve over time to lower transaction costs, offset problems of
incomplete information, and encourage greater efficiency in the functioning of markets").
73. See Randall Peerenboom, Human Rights and Rule of Law: What's the Relation-
ship?, 36 GEO. J. INT'L L. 809 (2005).
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Likewise, the rule of law is the foundation for economic growth and
prosperity :
4
Law is a key element of both a true and a stable democracy and of
efficient economic interaction and development both domestically
and internationally .... The quality and availability of court ser-
vices affect private investment decision and economic behavior at
large, from domestic partnerships to foreign investment. 75
Foreign businesses that invest or do business abroad want to ensure
that their intellectual property, shareholder, capital repatriation, contract,
and real property rights will be protected.76 It is not surprising, then, that in
74. 0. Lee Reed, Law, the Rule of Law, and Property: A Foundation for the Private
Market and Business Study, 38 AM. Bus. L.J. 441, 447 (2001) (quoting Kofi Annan's address
to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and arguing that all business professors and students must
study and understand that the rule of law and property law are the starting points for grasping
how a private market functions, because law may be defined as "the formal social ordering
force of modem society" which is "fundamental for business practice under conditions of
heterogeneity found in the modem nation-State"); see also Bernard S. Black, The Legal and
Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities Markets, 48 UCLA L. REv. 781, 790-91
(2001). Black states,
An honest judiciary is a must for investor remedies to be meaningful, but is often
partly or wholly absent in developing countries. Decent judicial salaries are needed
if judges are to stay honest. Good training helps-professionalism can be a bulwark
against corruption. Honest prosecutors are an essential support for honest courts,
lest a powerful defendant combine a bribe if a judge is compliant with a personal
threat if she is not.
Id.
75. BUSCAGLIA, DAKOLIAS & RATLIFF, supra note 65, at 9; see also Daniel Kaufman,
Aart Kraay & Pablo Zoido-Lobaton, Governance Matters (World Bank, Policy Research
Working Paper No. 2196, 1999) (reporting that broad measures of effective government and of
"rule of law"-predictability of court decisions and enforceability of contracts--correlate
positively with per capita GDP, while corruption correlates inversely with GDP); Thomas
Ulen, A Quantitative Assessment of the Efficiency of the Judicial Sector in Latin America, 17
INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 275 (1997) (stating that the results of business surveys throughout
Latin America indicate that the judicial system is seen as a constraint to reasonable accessibil-
ity for those in the private sector).
76. See Carol Graham & Moises Naim, The Political Economy of Institutional Reform
in Latin America, in BEYOND TRADE-OFFS: MARKET REFORM AND EQUITABLE GROWTH IN
LATIN AMERICA 322 (Nancy Birdsall, Carol Graham & Richard H. Sabst eds., Inter-Am. Dev.
Bank 1998). They state,
Macroeconomic reforms are diverse, yet all of them have three characteristics in
common: reform decisions center on changing the rules guiding macroeconomic
behavior; reforms are adopted by the executive branch in relative isolation from the
rest of the political system; and new policies imply the dismantling of many exist-
ing agencies, rather than the building of new institutions. Institutional reforms are
quite different, and entail changing organizations needed to support the new eco-
nomic policies (such as regulatory and export promotion agencies, and social safety
nets), as well as the upgrading of existing public agencies devastated by decades of
neglect, under investment, and capture by special interests.
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the aftermath of the economic reforms, or at times concurrently, there also
have been efforts to implement new criminal procedures, protect human
and civil rights, and increase access to justice.77 Economic growth and sus-
tainable development require a functioning, transparent, and efficient
judicial sector.78 "[I]t is not enough to build highways and factories to
modernize a State ... a reliable justice system-the very basis of civili-
zation-is needed as well. 79 Without the rule of law, corruption in the
tendering regimes was rampant, encouraging the looting of national
treasuries,"° the exploitation of labor, and the polluting of the environ-
ment.8' As Professor Joseph Stiglitz sadly points out, "The market
77. Cf Jorge Correa Sutil, Judicial Reforms in Latin America: Good News for the Un-
derprivileged?, in THE (UN)RULE OF LAW & THE UNDERPRIVILEGED IN LATIN AMERICA 255,
268 (Juan E. Mdndez, Guillermo O'Donnell & Paulo Sdrgio Pinheiro eds., 1999) (proposing
that "[a] preliminary and not very optimistic conclusion would be that judicial reforms in
Latin America are definitively linked more with the opening of markets that with any other
factor").
78. For the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), "[a]n independent,
efficient, and transparent judiciary is not only fundamental for a functioning democracy but
also a prerequisite for increased external investment." U.S. AGENCY FOR INT'L DEV. [USAID],
USAID CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION 2004: LATIN AMERICA AND CARIBBEAN
(2004), available at http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2004/latin-americacaribbean/.
The World Bank has also agreed that "good macro policy is not enough; good institutions are
critical for macroeconomic stability in today's world of global financial integration." WORLD
BANK, BEYOND THE WASHINGTON CONSENSUS: INSTITUTIONS MATTER 3 (1998) (emphasis in
original); Graham & Naim, supra note 76, at 321 (explaining how, although "Latin America's
macroeconomic turnaround of the 1990s ... has been widely successful," the focus changed
by the mid-1990s, and the goal that "dominated the attention of policymakers, multilateral
institutions and researchers [became] 'institution building'"); see generally Luis Salas, From
Law and Development to Rule of Law: New and Old Issues in Justice Reform in Latin Amer-
ica, in RULE OF LAW IN LATIN AMERICA: THE INTERNATIONAL PROMOTION OF JUDICIAL
REFORM 17, 24-28 (Pilar Domingo & Rachel Sieder eds., 2002).
79. Maria Dakolias, A Strategy for Judicial Reform: The Experience in Latin America,
36 VA. J. INT'L L. 167 (1995) (citing Friday Dialogue, PRESENCIA (La Paz), July 22, 1994, at
2, translated in Justice Minister Discusses Need for Reform, F.B.I.S. DAILY REP.: LATIN AM.,
Aug. 29, 1994, at 49, 51 (interviewing Bolivian Minister of Justice Rene Blattman)); Pilar
Domingo, Judicialization of Politics or Politicization of the Judiciary? Recent Trends in Latin
America, in DEMOCRATIZATION 104, 105 (2004) (asserting that "promoting rule of law has
become widely accepted throughout the region as a necessary aspiration for the consolidation
of democracy, and is very much part of the remit of state reform and quest for 'good govern-
ance' ").
80. See Pilar Domingo, Judicial Independence and Judicial Reform in Latin America, in
THE SELF-RESTRAINING STATE: POWER AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN NEW DEMOCRACIES 151,
151 (Andreas Schelder, Larry Diamond & Marc F. Plattner eds., 1999) (finding that "[o]ne of
the major challenges for the new democracies is to establish credible mechanisms of account-
ability," where accountability is defined as a system wherein officials are responsible for their
actions within a "pre-established legal and constitutional framework that sets the limits and
powers of state agencies and government organs").
81. See Sutil, supra note 77, at 265 (examining the breadth of judicial responsibility,
including economic issues "related to the right to limit or ban some industrial projects in order
to protect the economy"); see also Sieder, Schjolden & Angell, supra note 50, at 1 (enumerat-
ing the reasons people resort to the courts to assert their rights, including "the weakness of
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system requires clearly established property rights and the courts to en-
force them; but often these are absent in developing countries."82
A healthy and independent judicial power is also one third of a
healthy democratic government.83 Along with the executive and legisla-
tive branches, the judicial branch helps form the checks and balances to
allow for an effective system of governance. Instead, what has resulted
over the last few decades in many Latin American governments is a
breakdown in the rule of law: a judiciary unable to change itself, virtual
impunity from prosecution, judicial officers gunned down, and the
wholesale interference with the independence of the judicial power. The
judiciary is not as independent as the other two branches of govern-
ment.84 Instead, the judiciary functions as part of the civil service: devoid
of law-making abilities, merely a slot machine for justice that applies the
various codes.85
Since emerging from decades of dictatorship, many Latin American
countries have focused, in varying degrees, on reforming their
respective legal systems.86 Governments have introduced alternative
effective citizenship rights, the insecurities and hardships produced by economic crisis, and
the failure of neoliberal policies to alleviate poverty").
82. JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 74 (2002) (stating also
that "[tihere is no question that flaws in the financial system (and overhang of nonperforming
loans) must be addressed before rapid sustainable growth can be resumed"); see also Anne 0.
Krueger, Why Crony Capitalism is Bad for Economic Growth, in CRONY CAPITALISM AND
ECONOMIC GROWTH IN LATIN AMERICA 22 (Stephen Haber ed., 2002).
83. Sieder, Schjolden & Angell, supra note 50, at 1 (explaining that constitutional re-
view became more important in the 1990s, and how "in many countries constitutional courts
and supreme courts are now more active in counterbalancing executive and congressional
power than at any previous time").
84. See WILLIAM C. PRILLAMAN, THE JUDICIARY AND DEMOCRATIC DECAY IN LATIN
AMERICA: DECLINING CONFIDENCE IN THE RULE OF LAW (2000). Prillaman observes,
Perhaps the most noted phenomenon in Latin American judiciaries has been the in-
ability to achieve the delicate balance between judicial independence and judicial
accountability, particularly because of the various measures that politicians have
used to reduce institutional independence: limiting tenure, packing courts, purging
court personnel, and creating special tribunals under the executive branch that by-
pass or replace the formal judicial hierarchy.
Id. at 19.
85. Garcfa, supra note 63, at 1285 (noting that "the core bureaucratic culture of the
judiciary--expressed mainly in highly formal judicial processes, a judicial philosophy devoid
of historical and substantive policy considerations, and a rigid organization unyielding to
changing social demands and conditions-remains virtually unaltered" and identifying and
describing the major historic, institutional, and organizational constraints governing the judi-
ciaries' structure and operations in the region).
86. See generally Joseph R. Thorne, Heading South But Looking North: Globalization
and Law Reform in Latin America, 2000 Wis. L. REV. 691 (exploring overall trends in Latin
America, particularly economic and social concerns). There has been a long history of schol-
arship in Latin America concerning reform of the criminal law and its procedure. See
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dispute resolution mechanisms,87 updated judicial case management
systems," codified laws,89 partially altered the legal education system,9°
and encouraged pro bono activities through legal clinic opportunities for
law students.9' A variety of methods and projects have been applied to
modernizing the judicial sector, with limited results on a region-wide
basis. 92 Like other areas for reform, there have been attempts at
transforming criminal procedure. 93 Criminal law has been a source of
EUGENIO RA(JL ZAFFARONI, ORIGEN Y EVOLUCION DEL DISCURSO CRfTICO EN EL DERECHO
PENAL [ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF CRITICAL DISCOURSE IN CRIMINAL LAW] (2004).
87. Dakolias, supra note 79, at 168-69 (asserting that "the transition from family-rn
businesses, which did not rely on laws and formal mechanisms to resolve conflicts, to transac-
tions with unknown actors has created a need for formal conflict resolution"); see also
Thomas J. Moyer & Emily Stewart Haynes, Mediation as a Catalyst for Judicial Reform in
Latin America, 18 OHIO ST. J. DIsP. RESOL. 619 (2003); see generally Cynthia Alkon, The
Cookie Cutter Syndrome: Legal Reform Assistance Under Post-Communist Democratization
Programs, 2002 J. Disp. RESOL. 327 (2002) (discussing attempts to bring legal reform, spe-
cifically alternative dispute resolution, to emerging democracies).
88. LINN HAMMERGREN, ENVISIONING REFORM: IMPROVING JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE
IN LATIN AMERICA 12 (2007) (finding that USAID "was especially important [in the field of
judicial administration], because the U.S. courts were the most advanced in court administra-
tion, and the United States at the time still dominated the field in donor assistance").
89. See generally GARDNER, supra note 52, at 14 (noting the absence of the U.S. legal
education model in Latin America and elsewhere); Alfredo Fuentes-Hemdndez, Globalization
and Legal Education in Latin America: Issues for Law and Development in the 21st Century,
21 PENN ST. INT'L L. REV. 39 (2002); cf Friedman, supra note 37, at 74 (finding it difficult,
for good reason, to learn about a "living legal system" simply by an "examination [of] the
curriculum of a law school or by reading legal periodicals").
90. Friedman, supra note 37, at 74.
91. DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 5, at 246 (noting, however, that "it is conceded by
all that the efforts have not come close to achieving the stated purposes of transforming legal
education and legal scholarship or building the independence and stature of the courts").
92. See generally BUSCAGLIA, DAKOLIAS & RATLIFF, supra note 65; LA JUSTICIA MAS
ALLA DE NUESTRAS FRONTERAS: EXPERIENCIAS DE REFORMA UTILES PARA AM9RICA LATINA Y
EL CARIBE [JUSTICE BEYOND OUR BORDERS: EXPERIENCES OF REFORM USEFUL FOR LATIN
AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN] (Christine Bieberhseimer & Carlos Cordovez eds., 1999).
Another commentator notes,
The judiciary in the Latin American region is facing a mounting challenge in terms
of its creditability, its functional effectiveness, its standing vis-A-vis the other pow-
ers of the state, its contribution as a bulwark for the protection of human rights in
societies with vulnerable democratic institutions, its role in promoting a predictable
institutional environment in the economic sphere, and its obligation to provide a fo-
rum for the fair and effective resolution of disputes. This challenge has been
mounting for decades, resulting from claims of various constituencies who have not
seen their demands for justice met.
Garcfa, supra note 63, at 1268.
93. BUSCAGLIA, DAKOLIAS & RATLIFF, supra note 65, at 21 (noting that these reforms,
because they might seem threatening to those in power, should be implemented slowly).
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legal transplantation throughout history." It is not surprising, then, that
this is a focus of post-dictatorship administrations.9 The criminal law
and the closed, secret trial procedures that are part of the inquisitorial
system96 became a metaphor for the dictatorships.97
A final point which emphasizes the relevance of the criminal
justice system to the consolidation of democratic institutions re-
lates to the need to replace a slow and arcane criminal process
with a relatively speedy and open system of administration of
justice. The establishment of open, oral, and concentrated trials,
to be held with relative speed after the commission of a crime, is
94. JOHN MERRYMAN, DAVID CLARK & LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, LAW AND SOCIAL
CHANGE IN MEDITERRANEAN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA: A HANDBOOK OF LEGAL AND
SOCIAL INDICATORS FOR COMPARATIVE STUDY 421 (1979).
95. HAMMERGREN, supra note 88, at 9 (explaining how the first round of Latin Ameri-
can reforms in the early 1980s "focused largely on criminal justice from the standpoint of
containing human rights abuses and ending the impunity of abusers").
96. The inquisitorial model of criminal procedure is derived from the traditions of in-
vestigation brought over by the colonizing nations. MERRYMAN, supra note 6, at 127. A truth-
telling exercise, based on Papal Encyclicals and Canonist Law, the inquisitorial criminal proc-
ess is conducted by an investigating judge who discovers the truth concerning a crime and
then sentences the defendant. That is,
[E]vidence is gathered by judges or judge-like investigators, public officers who
operate under a duty to seek the truth. Criminal investigation is understood to be a
public rather than a private function. At trial, the presiding judge examines the wit-
nesses. The lawyers for the prosecution and defense play subordinate roles, mostly
recommending lines of inquiry, sometimes supplementing the court's questioning of
witnesses.
JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL 1 (2003).
In the inquisitorial model, there are no oral hearings, nor are there opportunities for the
accused to confront his or her accusers or the chance to rebut testimony and impeach the
credibility of witnesses. Instead, the process is slow, held in secret, and involves a court func-
tionary taking depositions. This civil servant, who is neither a judge nor a law school graduate,
then reduces the testimony to writing for the investigating judge to read later. The defendant is
an object of investigation, rather than a subject with human and civil rights. The inquisitorial
system does not facilitate due process, transparency, or participation. It is no surprise that the
inquisitorial system also permits, on occasion, torture and other violations of human rights.
See MERRYMAN, supra note 6, at 127-28 (explaining also that, "[i]n the civil law world,
movement toward the extremes of the inquisitorial model was impelled by the revival of Ro-
man law, the influence of canonic procedure, and, most important, the rise of statism").
97. BRIAN LOVEMAN, THE CONSTITUTION OF TYRANNY: REGIMES OF EXCEPTION IN
SPANISH AMERICA 347 (1993) (stating that the "crdigo penal provided government officials
and police with the authority to combat unruly crowds, political protests, and, later, union
organization and strikes without recourse to regimes of exception' and, likewise, in pre-
revolutionary France, there was much abuse of the criminal law by the ancien regime); MER-
RYMAN, supra note 6, at 128 (explaining also how public sentiment in the eighteenth century
forced a reform of criminal procedure during the European revolutions).
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crucial to providing transparency to the administration of jus-
tice.98
This move from the inquisitorial to the adversarial system of crimi-
nal procedure is often part of the return to democracy in many countries
once the military has returned to the barracks. 99 Criminal procedure is
fundamental to human rights, as it was often utilized by military regimes
as a tool of repression.'0c In adversarial systems, however, there is par-
ticipation in court proceedings, and victims may confront the accused.
Defendants now have the opportunity to hear the evidence being used
against them. Families may participate and be present during the exami-
nation and cross-examination.
Despite the implementation of some of these more transparent court
procedures, judicial reforms in many parts of Latin America have not
met with great success,' °' leading one analyst to conclude: "In Latin
America, there is no justice system. There is an authoritarian political
system and the courts are its instruments."'02 Chile, however, has been an
exception to this rule.'03 Legal reform efforts in Chile have succeeded for
a number of reasons.
98. Alejandro M. Garro, Nine Years of Transition to Democracy in Argentina: Partial
Failure or Qualified Success?, 31 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 37 (1993).
99. See Domingo, supra note 80, at 151.
100. Garro, supra note 98, at 37 (asserting that the "establishment of open, oral and
concentrated trials, to be held with relative speed after the commission of a crime, is crucial to
providing transparency to the administration of justice"); see also HAMMERGREN, supra note
88, at 10 (noting that these "reforms received financial backing and additional impetus from
foreign donors, especially the United States. The latter added an interest in prosecuting state
agents who had perpetuated abuses").
101. See Jorge L. Esquirol, The Failed Law of Latin America, 56 AM. J. COMp. L. 75
(2008) (analyzing legal development writing about Latin America and critiquing the "failed
law" discourse).
102. VARGAS LLOSA, supra note 66, at 213. For a more balanced, if a little precipitous,
conclusion, see generally LA JUSTICIA MAS ALLA DE NUESTRAS FRONTERAS, supra note 92; see
also HAMMERGREN, supra note 88, at 2 (finding, unfortunately, that the majority believes that
"most reforms are still on the wrong track and thus, if they get anywhere, will likely arrive at
the wrong destination").
103. ANTHONY W. PEREIRA, POLITICAL (IN)JUSTICE: AUTHORITARIANISM AND THE
RULE OF LAW IN BRAZIL, CHILE, AND ARGENTINA 94 (2005) (comparing Chile to the rest of
Latin America and finding it "a particularly rule-bound and orderly society"); see also Fuji-
mori's Trials, ECONOMIST, Jan. 7, 2006, at 20 (agreeing with the assessment that "Chile prides
itself on applying the rule of law more rigorously than its neighbours").
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A. Why Chile
The Chileans love laws, the more complicated the better Noth-
ing fascinates us as much as red tape and multiple forms.
-Isabel Allende' °4
Chileans are often celebrated as the best adapters and adopters of le-
gal reforms because they have strong institutions to support democratic
governance and the rule of law. 05 Chile has had a history of legal trans-
plantation since it first declared independence in 1810.'° Chile derived
its laws and legal culture in part from Roman legal culture. During the
pre-independence Colonial Period and the post-independence National
Period, the laws that were transplanted came from Spanish colonial rule,
and reflected the legal cultures of France, Italy, Spain, and even Great
Britain. 7
Since the Latin American Colonial Period and the National Period,
Europe and the United States have each played varying roles in assisting
the legal development of the new countries in Latin America, including
Chile. The region has long been a testing ground for judicial reform, the
creation of markets, and economic integration.00 Dezalay and Garth
note:
Chile was a laboratory in which contenders for legitimate state
expertise in the north invested heavily, whether through
104. ISABEL ALLENDE, MY INVENTED COUNTRY 91-92 (Margaret Sayers Peden trans.,
HarperCollins 2003) (2003).
105. See Harry Barnes, Lessons of the Chilean Transition to Democracy, in THE U.S.
CONSTITUTION AND THE CONSTITUTIONS OF LATIN AMERICA 155 (Kenneth W. Thompson ed.,
1991); Rafael X. Zahralddin-Aravena, Chile and Singapore: The Individual and the Collec-
tive: A Comparison, 12 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 739, 808 (1998).
106. See generally MIROW, supra note 64, at xiii (describing the general trajectory of
post-independence, Spanish-speaking, Latin American legal systems). Mirow further notes
that
[i]n the independence period, private law responded to new republican values and
nationalism through substantive changes in rules and through codification based on
European models. For the twentieth century, private law responded to the increasing
demands of national commerce and social advances. An important shift noted dur-
ing this work is a decrease in the importance of imported private law from Europe
as a source and an increase in domestic developments, although still often informed
by North American and international private law.
Id.
107. See id. at 168-69; see also LOVEMAN, supra note 97, at 4 (explaining that the "lib-
eral principles of France, Britain and the United States failed as replacements" when the
"divinely inspired law of the Spanish kings" was overthrown due to the early nineteenth cen-
tury independence movements).
108. See Kurtz, supra note 5.
Spring 2008]
Michigan Journal of International Law
democratic socialism or liberal economics. What happened in
Chile, therefore, played directly into northern debates fought in
the media, universities and think tanks."w
For more than three decades, the Andean country was a model for
privatization and policies-the precursor to the Washington Consen-
sus." o In the aftermath of the military coup of September 11, 1973,
which overthrew the government of President Salvador Allende,"' a
group of free market economists educated at the University of Chicago
returned to Chile to take over government ministries. 2 During the mili-
tary dictatorship of General Augusto Pinochet, Chile's own "Chicago
Boys" played a key role in the transition toward neo-liberal economics.
' 3
109. DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 5, at 141 (developing a positive social analysis of
how law relates to the field of state power and its reproduction and transformation over time).
110. See Barnes, supra note 105, at 158-59 (noting how Chile's "rapid economic recov-
ery of the 1980s became a model for how a developing country with a heavy debt burden ...
puts its house in order"); Guillermo Perry & Danny M. Leipziger, Introduction, in CHILE:
RECENT POLICY LESSONS AND EMERGING CHALLENGES 3 (Guillermo Perry & Danny M.
Leipziger eds., 1999); Wilson, supra note 6, at 519 (reporting the consensus that Chile is "con-
sidered by many to be among the most successful market economies of the South"). Perry and
Leipziger state,
The "Chilean model" has been expostulated for some time in the region and else-
where because it appeared that the country, despite terrible political and economic
turmoil, embodied important lessons about economic management. Arenas often
cited include banking crisis management, pension policy innovation, new export
market development privatization, and targeted social policies. More broadly, the
dominance of market solutions in the country, its public policy discipline, and so-
cial policy advancements have promoted the Chilean case to the forefront of
replicable lessons.
Perry & Leipziger, supra, at 3.
Ill. See generally CHILE: THE BALANCED VIEW: A RECOMPILATION OF ARTICLES
ABOUT THE ALLENDE YEARS AND AFTER (Francisco Orrego Vicufia ed., 1975) (providing a
compilation of articles about the Allende years from a contemporary perspective).
112. See generally Ronald Fischer, Rodrigo Gutierrez & Pablo Serra, The Effects of
Privatization on Firms: The Chilean Case, in PRIVATIZATION IN LATIN AMERICA: MYTHS AND
REALITIES, supra note 70, at 197, 198 (reporting the opinion of many analysts that "the strong
growth of the Chilean economy that began in 1985 (after a severe crisis in the first half of the
decade) [can be ascribed] to economic liberalization").
113. Patricio Silva, Technocrats and Politics in Chile: From the Chicago Boys to the
CIEPLAN Monks, in MONEY DOCTORS, supra note 48, at 205, 213 (explaining the Chicago
Boys' "seven modernizations" and their plan to "establish the rules of neoliberalism in all
spheres of society"); see also VARGAS LLOSA, supra note 66, at 151. Vargas Llosa states,
Privatization started in 1974 when the government returned entities that had been
expropriated: industrial commercial companies first, then financial institutions. It
continued with the sale of enterprises that had been in state hands since the 1960s.
The recession of the early 1980s put a hold on this policy, but privatization resumed
in 1984, with industrial commodities, and primary products corporations sold to
private interests.
VARGAS LLOSA, supra note 66, at 151.
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Chile was a pilot site for a litany of reforms, including the privatization
of social security"' and pensions."' Economic growth resulted, ' 6 and
Chile continues to earn a favorable trade balance, and, with the excep-
tion of 1993, to "run[] up an impressive cumulative surplus.""' 7 The
Chileans have cherry-picked the best aspects of a variety of models in
the private law field (most of which emanated from the United States"8 ),
laying the foundations for a market economy. '
Although Chile has historically been a willing recipient of free mar-
ket economic models,"O legal reforms were interrupted during the
114. See Jos6 Pifiera, Op-Ed., Retiring in Chile, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 1, 2004, at A3 1.
115. Fischer, Gutierrez & Serra, supra note 112, at 197 (characterizing the Chilean priva-
tization process as "all-encompassing"); see generally Angelo Codevilla, Is Pinochet the
Model?, FOREIGN AFF., Nov/Dec. 1993, at 127.
116. In an issue devoted to the unique situation in Latin America, the journal Latin
American Economic Policies found that, "[b]etween 1992 and 1996, Chilean GDP per capita
expanded more than 30 percent in real terms. During the same period, moderate poverty regis-
tered a substantial decline from 20 to 16 percent .... But income inequality also increased
during this period." Research Dep't, Inter-Am. Dev. Bank, 14 LATIN AM. ECON. POLICIES 1
(2001); see generally MARTIN MULLINS, IN THE SHADOW OF THE GENERALS: FOREIGN POL-
ICY MAKING IN ARGENTINA, BRAZIL AND CHILE 102 (2006); Couso, supra note 62, at 73
(crediting the "neo-classical economic model inherited by the democratic government" with
"dramatically reduc[ing]" poverty in Chile, but admitting that the number of people still living
in poverty remains "unacceptably high"); Alejandro Foxley T. & Claudio Sapelli, Chile's
Political Economy in the 1990s: Some Governance Issues, in CHILE: RECENT POLICY LESSONS
AND EMERGING CHALLENGES, supra note 110, at 393, 421 (questioning the "replicability" of
the Chilean experience in light of Chile's unique, "historical development and context, the
weight of its political institutions throughout its history, and the framework within which the
transition process has taken place").
117. Juan M. del Aguila, The Politics on Free Trade in Latin America, 50 EMORY L.J.
759, 766 (2001).
118. See Barnes, supra note 105, at 160 (attributing the Chilean identification with the
United States to "the democratic link[,] . . . the fact that a number of Chileans have been edu-
cated in this country, and.., a common economic philosophy").
119. See generally ALEJANDRO FOXLEY, LATIN AMERICAN EXPERIMENTS IN NEOCON-
SERVATIVE ECONOMICS (1983).
120. For example,
[i]n 1840, Chile created a commission to draft a new civil code. The commission
consisted of five members, including Andrrs Bello. After graduating in 1802 from
the Royal and Pontifical University of Caracas, Bello held several official positions
in his native Venezuela. After a stay in England where he had accompanied Simon
Bolivar on a mission, he immigrated to Santiago, Chile, in 1819, where he stayed
until his death in 1865. During that time he held several important posts in the Chil-
ean government and was the main author of the new civil code that was
implemented in 1857 and has been in effect ever since. The main influences of the
Bello Code derived from Roman, Spanish, French, and other European laws. Sub-
sequently, the Chilean Code was adopted by Colombia and Ecuador, and referenced
by Argentina, Paraguay, Venezuela, El Salvador, and Nicaragua.
James Cooper, Introduccidn a la Reforma Procesal Civil: Lecciones Acerca de la Reforma
Juridica [Introduction to the Reform of Civil Procedure: Lessons of Judicial Reform], DERE-
CHO MAYOR, Apr. 2008, at 161, 167.
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Pinochet era.'2' In fact, the Chilean judiciary was often seen as part of the
right-wing reactionary forces that oppressed the populace during the
seventeen-year-long dictatorship.'2 2 According to Lisa Hilbink, the courts
in Chile became an explicit part of the compromise with Pinochet.123 In
addition to its poor record on the protection of human rights, 24 the judi-
ciary also suffered from a number of inefficiencies, including the
backlog of cases and other structural problems that plagued the admini-
stration of justice. These issues did not disappear, but were transferred to
the new government when Chile returned to democracy in 1990.25 Thus,
"[i]n Chile, the military junta that was in power from 1973 to 1990 has
121. Reforms were not only interrupted, they were also reversed by repressive legal
instruments such as those provided in the 1980 Constitution. See JUAN J. LINZ & ALFRED
STEPAN, PROBLEMS OF DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION AND CONSOLIDATION: SOUTHERN EUROPE,
SOUTH AMERICA, AND POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE (1996). Linz and Stepan note,
[T]he most constraining constitutional formula for a new democratic government is
one where the incoming government has to agree to rule with an authoritarian con-
stitution crafted by an outgoing authoritarian regime. Given General Pinochet's
strong bargaining position, he was able to extract this price. The newly elected gov-
ernment in Chile agreed to begin their rule with the 1980 constitution (partially
amended in 1989) and to try to eliminate its authoritarian features by the difficult
constitutional amendment procedures stipulated in the constitution itself.
Id. at 206.
122. PEREIRA, supra note 103, at 92 (explaining how the Chilean military regime used
old laws, "the Law of State Security, passed in 1958, and the Arms Control Law, passed under
Allende in 1972," in order to do what it saw as defending a "social and legal order that had
been threatened by the Allende government").
123. Lisa Hilbink, An Exception to Chilean Exceptionalism? The Historical Role of
Chile's Judiciary, in WHAT JUSTICE? WHOSE JUSTICE? FIGHTING FOR FAIRNESS IN LATIN
AMERICA 64, 76 (Susan Eva Eckstein & Timothy P. Wickham-Crowley eds., 2003). Another
commentator agrees that
[t]he legal system was no obstacle to the policies of the military government, which
were directed at eliminating its adversaries and imposing a new normative mold for
human life on the country. In particular, the courts of appeal, directed by the Su-
preme Court, denied numerous habeas corpus petitions submitted to help those who
were detained by the armed forces or the police and who were not brought before a
judge. Acting in this way, the courts did not follow through with their constitutional
and legal obligations, and graver still, caused the citizenry to lose confidence in the
idea that there existed an institution of the State to which they could turn to protest
abuses committed by government functionaries. That is to say, they helped destroy
the legacy of the history of a country respectful of the law and of human rights.
Edmundo Fuenzalida Faivovich, Law and Legal Culture in Chile, 1974-1999, in LEGAL CUL-
TURE IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION, supra note 28, at 108, 129.
124. LISA HILBINK, JUDGES BEYOND POLITICS IN DEMOCRACY AND DICTATORSHIP 1
(2007) (explaining that the courts gave the military government "nearly complete autonomy to
pursue its 'war' against Marxism," legitimized the "regime's expansive police powers," ac-
cepted governmental explanations about the "disappeared," and implemented "arbitrary
decrees, secret laws and policies that violated" the legal code).
125. DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 5, at 228.
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tried very hard to make itself immune to prosecutions.' 26 In the 1990s,
that situation changed.' 21 With the establishment of the Judicial Academy
and a focus on new criminal procedures that promoted transparency, par-
ticipation, and efficiency," Chile began its reform process to bring about
more access to justice.' 29 Following years of economic reforms, transpar-
ency became paramount.
This transparency was much needed.'3 ° By 1995, Chile's judiciary
suffered from such a "decrepit structure and inefficient administration
that ... in Chile justice became terminally ill and, unless it undergoes
major surgery, it [would be] condemned to death."'3 ' But with the end of
the dictatorship in 1990, and the subsequent consolidation of democratic
governance, which is "often held up as one of the most successful cases
of democratic consolidation in Latin America,''0 32 Chile has been able to
provide better access to justice.' 33 The thriving academic community and
126. JOHN ELSTER, CLOSING THE BOOKS: TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN HISTORICAL PER-
SPECTIVE 64 (2004).
127. Cf Hilbink, supra note 123, at 66 (noting that, "[e]ven after the transition to civilian
rule in 1990, judges, with few exceptions, failed to take stands in defense of greater liberality;
conservatism and conformity continued to reign within the judiciary hierarchy").
128. See generally Robert G. Vaughn, Proposals for Judicial Reform in Chile, 16 FORD-
HAM INT'L L.J. 577 (1992-1993).
129. See Luis Manriquez Reyes, Modernization of Judicial Systems in Developing Coun-
tries: The Case of Chile, in JUDICIAL REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN,
PROCEEDINGS OF A WORLD BANK CONFERENCE 195 (Malcolm Rowat et al. eds., 1995) (exam-
ining the state of the Chilean legal system and the reasons that it needs to be reformed). There
was also a general amnesty granted for the military with the return to democracy. See Robert
J. Quinn, Will the Rule of Law End? Challenging Grants of Amnesty for the Human Rights
Violations of a Prior Regime: Chile's New Model, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 905 (1994). For a
detailed examination of the liberalization efforts by the Chilean Government in the post-
Pinochet era, see HILBINK, supra note 124, at 179-89.
130. BUSCAGLIA, DAKOLIAS & RATLIFF, supra note 65, at 6 (writing in 1995, before
major reforms were undertaken, that "[a]lthough Chile has perhaps the most highly regarded
system in Latin America, respondents to this poll called their system 'bad, inefficient, dis-
criminatory, arbitrary and slow' ").
131. Id. at 6 (citing Grace Gibson & Cecilia Valenzuela, Las penas de la justicia [Sen-
tences of Justice], Qu9 PASA (Santiago de Chile), Dec. 10, 1994, at 54). For the first quotation,
see JUSTICIA Y MARGINALIDAD, PERCEPCI6N DE LOS POBRES: RESULTADOS Y ANALISIS DE UN
ESTUDIO EMPIRICO [JUSTICE AND MARGINALIZATION, PERCEPTIONS OF THE POOR: RESULTS
AND ANALYSIS OF AN EMPIRICAL STUDY] 64 (Jorge Correa Sutil & Luis Barros eds., Instituto
de Estudios Econ6micos Press 1992); see also Edgardo Buscaglia, Judicial Reform in Latin
America: The Main Obstacles Ahead, J. LATIN AM. AFF., Nov. 1995, at 8; Edgardo Buscaglia,
Stark Picture of Justice, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 21, 1995, at AI3; James Cooper, Op-Ed., Argentina
and the Rule of Law, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, Feb. 20, 2002, at B9.
132. Javier A. Couso, The Judicialization of Chilean Politics: The Rights Revolution That
Never Was, in THE JUDICIALIZATION OF POLITICS IN LATIN AMERICA, supra note 50, at 105,
123. But cf Wilson, supra note 6, at 526 (disagreeing and asserting that "[t]oday, Chile is still
an incomplete democracy").
133. See Michael Samway, Access to Justice: A Study of Legal Assistance Programs for
the Poor in Santiago, Chile, 6 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 347 (1996) (exploring Chilean re-
forms in detail and explaining that reforms implemented to provide Chileans with better
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its interactions with legislators and Ministry of Justice officials, as well
as with bureaucrats from other state institutions, helped to build new
state institutions such as the Public Defenders and National Prosecutors
offices and to implement new criminal procedures. 34 Later, these func-
tionaries filled law school faculties with part-time professors and
assisted in consolidating reform efforts. In the late 1990s, Chile under-
took an intensive reform process of its criminal procedure, region by
region, transitioning from the inquisitorial model to the adversarial
model.'35 Some $638 million were spent in the process.' 36 Although the
Chilean Government had to delay the inauguration of the reform for a
half year, until July 2005, in the metropolitan region of Santiago the new
criminal procedures are now installed and functioning.'37
In reforming the Chilean legal system, foreign governments and
their respective aid agencies, law school educators, and think tank ex-
perts have tendered much influence through the training of legal sector
professionals.'38 While both the United States and Germany have played
important roles in reforming various parts of the legal system in Chile,
German influence dates back farther.
access to justice, including legal clinics for the poor, have succeeded in resolving some
100,000 cases out of court).
134. See Boletin No. 2365-07-1, Primer Informe de la Comisi6n de Constituci6n, Legis-
laci6n y Justicia sobre el proyecto de ley que crea la Defensoria Penal Ptblica [First Report of
the Constitutional, Legislative, and Judicial Commission on the Draft Law Creating a
Criminal Public Defender's Office] (Nov. 16, 1999) (Chile), available at http://
sil.congreso.cl/pags/index.html; Law No. 19.519, Sept. 16, 1997, D. OFCIAL No. 35.868
(Chile) (concerning the creation of the Public Ministry); see also Law No. 19.718, Mar. 10,
2001, D. OFICIAL No. 36.909 (Chile) (public defender law).
135. Carlos Rodrigo de la Barra Cousino, Chile: Adversarial vs. Inquisitorial Systems:
The Rule of Law and Prospects for Criminal Procedure Reform in Chile, 5 Sw. J.L. & TRADE
AM. 323 (1998).
136. See GOBIERNO DE CHILE, MINISTERIO DE JUSTICIA, [GOVERNMENT OF CHILE, MIN-
ISTRY OF JUSTICE] EL NUEVO SISTEMA PROCESAL PENAL CHILE&O [THE NEW SYSTEM OF
CHILEAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE] (2007).
137. For examinations of Chilean legal reform efforts, see generally STEVEN LOWEN-
STEIN, LAWYERS, LEGAL EDUCATION, AND DEVELOPMENT: AN EXAMINATION OF THE PROCESS
OF REFORM IN CHILE (International Legal Center 1970); Rafael Blanco, Richard Hutt & Hugo
Rojas, Reform to the Criminal Justice System in Chile: Evaluation and Challenges, 2 Loy. U.
CHI. INT'L L. REV. 253 (2005); James P. Carey, Reflection on Criminal Justice Reforms in
Chile, 2 Lov. U. CHI. INT'L L. REV. 271 (2005); John Henry Merryman, Law and Develop-
ment Memoirs I: The Chile Law Program, 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 481 (2000); Hugo Rojas,
Cambios Sociales y Cambios Juridicos en Chile: Construyendo Nuevos Puentes entre Soci-
ologia y Derecho en la Promoci6n del Realismo Juridico Latinoamericano [Social and Legal
Changes in Chile: Building New Bridges Between Sociology and Law in the Promotion of
Legal Reform in Latin America], 13 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 453 (2002).
138. See Alfredo Fuentes-Hemndez, supra note 89, at 44-46 (2002) (proposing that
legal education in Latin America be redesigned to include an interdisciplinary curriculum
educating law students in the values of democracy and on practical methods of how to con-
tribute to the region's social and economic development).
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III. THE GERMAN INFLUENCE IN CHILE
German influence on legal matters can be seen in many parts of the
world.'39 It is most noticeable, however, in Chile. For Professor Anthony
Pereira, Chile is distinguished by "its 'Prussianization.' ,140 German in-
fluence on Latin America, and on Chile in particular, dates back to the
Great Migrations. 41 After achieving its independence in 1810, Chile
sought to stimulate European immigration, primarily from Germany, the
Austro-Hungarian Empire, and the Russian Empire. There was some
success in attracting German immigrants to southern Chile, especially in
the Lake District.142 Large-scale German immigration into Chile occurred
primarily from 1850 to 1910.43 Some of its major influences are visible
today in Chilean architecture, food, and dress. Although the population
never surpassed five percent of the population in the southern regions,
the German influence fostered the nucleus of industrial progress, includ-
ing the city of Valdivia, home of beer, mills, and Chile's ship-building
industry.'" Until 1870, this German colonization was a success, and the
southern region of Chile became the most dynamic economic sector in
the country. The new citizens that Chile received from Germany brought
an example of strong work ethic, honor, and commercial enterprise,
bringing with them German know-how.14
With this large-scale immigration came increased military coopera-
tion between the Chileans and Germany. Between 1885 and 1931, there
were five German military missions to the Chilean army, resulting in a
Chilean military more vertical, cohesive, and rigid than the militaries of
139. Robin Wright, Syria Seeking Deal in U.N. Probe, WASH. POST, Sept. 23, 2005, at
A15. For months after the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri on
February 14, 2005, German Prosecutor, Detlev Mehlis, worked for the United Nations team
established to investigate the bombing. Eventually, agents of the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion were brought in to examine evidence at the site of the bombing. See FBI Joins
Investigation into Lebanon's Latest Bombing, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 28, 2005, available at
http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2005-09-28-lebanon-fbix.htm.
140. PEREIRA, supra note 103, at 48 (providing a study of institutional and personal rela-
tions between military and judicial elites in Brazil, Chile, and Argentina and how they form
the foundation for state repression).
141. International Migrations, http://www.ahtg.net/TpA/migrations.html (last visited Jan.
17, 2008).
142. Chile-Population, http://countrystudies.us/chile/38.htm (last visited Jan. 17, 2008).
143. Colonizaci6n Alemana en Valdivia y Llanquihue (1850-1910) [German Coloniza-
tion in Valdivia and Llanquihue (1850-1910)], http://www.memoriachilena.cl/temas/
index.asp?id-ut=lacolonizacionalemanadevaldiviayllanquihue: 1850-1910 (last visited Sept.
25, 2008).
144. See generally CARLOS SANHUEZA CERDA, CHILEE4OS EN ALEMANIA Y ALEMANES
EN CHILE: VIAJE Y NACI6N EN EL SIGLO XIX [CHILEANS IN GERMANY AND GERMANS IN CHI-
LE: TRAVEL AND NATIONALITY IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY] (2006).
145. See id.
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their region. 46 One of the greatest German influences in Chile to date has
been in the professionalization of the military. 47 Chile's army underwent
German-style educational and training programs, used German manuals,
employed German instructors both individually and in missions, and
armed its troops with German equipment.1 4 ' For example, many Chilean
military personnel studied under the retired German Captain Emil
Ktrner, who eventually rose to the rank of General in Chile.' 49 The over-
arching impact of the German influence on the Chilean military was to
stimulate political interest, and to motivate elitist, professional army of-
ficers to assume the responsibility of conducting national affairs.'50 This
connection clearly influenced Chilean foreign policy. In the First World
War, Chile did not side with the Allies against Germany." ' With the out-
break of the Second World War in 1939, the Chilean army, along with
other major armies of South America, assumed firm "civil imperative"
positions aimed at the maintenance of internal security and order. 52 Chile
remained neutral during the Second World War until 1943, when it even-
tually sided with the Allies.
153
The strong and influential German colony in the south of Chile made
Chile a natural haven for Nazi war criminals after 1945.'14 Moreover, the
Prussianization of Chile's military inevitably strengthened support of the
troops and officers behind the coup d'&tat against the democratically
elected government of Salvador Allende on September 11, 1973. From
1973 to 1989, Germany completely suspended development cooperation
with Chile.' 55 Bilateral cooperation between Chile and the Federal
146. PEREIRA, supra note 103, at 48.
147. Derick M. Nunn, Effects of European Military Training in Latin America: The Ori-
gins and Nature of Professional Militarism in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Peru, 1890-1940,
39 MIL. AFF. 1, 1-7 (1975).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Siegeskreuz: Augenminister Frank-Walter Steinmeier in Siidamerika-Deutsch-
Chilenische Militairkooperation [Cross of Victory: Secretary of State (F.R.G.) Frank-Walter
Steinmeier in South America-German-Chilean Military Cooperation], AG Friedensforschung
an der Uni Kassel [Organization for Peace Research at the University of Kassel], www.uni-
kassel.de/fb5/frieden/regionen/chile/brd.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2008).
152. Nunn, supra note 147, at 2.
153. JOHN L. RECTOR, THE HISTORY OF CHILE 151-52 (2004) (finding that while there
was widespread support among German-Chileans for the Axis Powers, President Juan Antonio
Rios and his "leftist supporters" opposed such support, and Chile remained neutral for much
of World War II until pressure from the United States eventually convinced Rios to break rela-
tions with the Axis powers in 1943, "in spite of fears of a German naval attack").
154. Die Emigration der NS-Tater nach 1945 [The Emigration of the National Socialist
Offenders after 1945], http://www.lbihs.at/LVText/BspReferat2004.pdf (last visited Sept. 25,
2008).
155. GTZ, GTZ in Chile, http://www.gtz.de/en/weltweitllateinamerika-karibik/626.htm
(last visited Aug. 16, 2008).
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Republic of Germany resumed in 1989 after the democratic election of
the government of Patricio Aylwin, who took over following the
Pinochet military dictatorship.' German university and consultancy
employees were sent abroad to "sell" their version of laws.'17 They had
success in spreading their legal culture in Eastern Europe as well as in
the Baltic countries,"' as Germany became a euphemism for progress.
159
By the mid- 1990s, German government cooperation in Chile primar-
ily focused on social development issues: education, health, andh 60
housing. Like the U.S. government's approach to the country, the
German government considers Chile to be a developed country, given
the advances made in economic development and improvement of the
social infrastructure.
16
156. Monte Reel, Bachelet Sworn in as Chile's President: Economic Development and
Equality Top Goal, WASH. POST, Mar. 12, 2006, at A12 (noting that during the Pinochet dicta-
torship, East Germany became a refuge for Chilean exiles from the left, including current
President Michelle Bachelet).
157. See Siniga Petrovi6, The Legal Regulation of Company Groups in Croatia, 2 EuR.
Bus. ORG. L. REV. 781, 781 (2001) (explaining that Croatia chose to adopt Germany's com-
pany group law and comprehensively regulate in this area).
158. See Gianmaria Ajani, By Chance and Prestige: Legal Transplants in Russia and
Eastern Europe, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 93, 110 (1995) (noting that Russia and the rest of the
former Soviet Union chose to promulgate versions of U.S. corporate and bankruptcy laws).
159. Neil G. McHardy, The New German Immigration Act, IMMIGR. L. TODAY, Jan./Feb.
2005, at 26 (announcing that, in addition to being thought progressive, "German laws are
known for their precision"). One commentator noted that
[tihere is little question that the value placed on law-abiding behavior in German
normative culture is very high indeed. That this may be paralleled by a much lower
level of actual conformity is a possibility which need not concern us here. Respect
for the law was throughout the nineteenth century one of the meeting grounds be-
tween modernized authoritarian traditions and the Rechtsstaat (government under
the rule of law) ideals of the liberal opposition.
Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Lawyers and Their Society, in EUROPEAN LEGAL CULTURES, supra
note 19, at 274, 275.
160. The German support for Chile in financial and technical cooperation from 1990 to
2006 had a budget of 450 million Euros (approximately $590 million). See German Embassy in
Santiago, Entwicklungspolitische Zusammenarbeit [Development Cooperation], http://
www.santiago.diplo.defVertretung/santiago/de/05/EntwicklungspolitischeZusammenarbeit/Ent
wicklungspolitische__Zusammenarbeit.html (last visited May 15, 2008). Germany is the most
important trading partner for Chile in the European Union. Bilaterale Beziehungen zwischen
Chile und Deutschland [Bilateral Relations between Chile and Germany] (Feb. 2008), http://
www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/de/Laenderinformationen/Chile/Bilateral.html.
161. With a GDP per capita of $6,151 in 2005, Chile is classified by the World Bank as an
upper middle income and moderately indebted economy. Chile is also considered the most
competitive and the least corrupt economy in Latin America. Chile has distinguished itself in
Latin America by its good economic performance (high growth rates, low inflation, and public
sector surplus), and its economic growth rate reached 6.3 percent in 2005. See The EU's
Relations with Chile, in EUROPEAN COMMISSION: EXTERNAL RELATIONS § III (2006), available
at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external-relations/chile/intro/index.htm#l.%20Economic%20and
%20trade%20relations.
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The Chilean government asked the German government to support
the drafting process of the new Criminal Procedure Code in 1995. That
year, the German Embassy in Chile and GTZ organized a visit to Ger-
many by the Chilean Minister of Justice, Maria Soledad Alvear. 62 The
Minister had several meetings with representatives of the German gov-
ernment in order to promote her request for legislative assistance. In
January 1996, GTZ sent the first evaluation group to Chile to work on a
project proposal. 63 Finally, in March 1996, during the intergovernmental
negotiations between Germany and Chile, the two governments agreed
on a project that was designed to last ten years, with a volume of ten mil-
lion German Deutschemarks (approximately 5 million Euros).' 64 The
project was to be executed in three different phases. The first part of the
project lasted three and half years, from June 1998 to December 2001,
with a total financial volume of 4.2 million German Deutschemarks (ap-
proximately 2.1 million Euros).165
It was not until October 1998, that the project (GTZ Project Number
95.2216.0) began. The first head of the project was Cornelius Prittwitz, a
well-known German law professor and judge, who now teaches at Frank-
furt University.166 In April 2002, the German and Chilean governments
agreed on the contents of the second project phase.' 67 As the Code of
Criminal Procedure had already been approved by the Chilean Congress,
the project was expanded to include the drafting process of a new law on
prisoners' rights, a new code on criminal offences, and a reform of the ju-
venile justice system (GTZ Project Number 2001.2239.0). A budget of 5.5
million German Deutschemarks (approximately 2.7 million Euros) was to
be spent over the four years spanning from April 2002 to March 2006.
Nevertheless, some 1.5 million German Deutschemarks were unspent dur-
ing the first part of the project. The German-Chilean binational project
ended in December 2006 without a further financial commitment. As
Chilean economic numbers improved, and as the new Code of Criminal
Procedure was fully operating, the project did not require a third phase. In
the end, the overall project lasted eight and a half years rather than the
original ten years that were anticipated.1
68
162. See GTZ, Final Internal Report on the Schlussbericht (2006) (on file with GTZ
headquarters) [hereinafter Final Report on the Schlussbericht].
163. See Internal Memorandum from Patricio Vallepfn, Informe Taller de Planificaci6n
ZOPP [Report Planning Workshop ZOPP] (1996) (on file with GTZ headquarters).
164. See GTZ, Internal Report on UnterztUtzung der Implementierung des neuen
Strafverfahrensrechtes, GTZ Project No. 95.2216.0 (1996) (on file with GTZ headquarters).
165. See id.
166. See Prof. Dr. jur. Cornelius Prittwitz--CV, http://www.jura.uni-frankfurt.de/fkurl/
prittwitz/Mitarbeiter/Mit_Prittwitz/CV_Prittwitzlindex.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2008).
167. GTZ FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, § 1.
168. See Final Report on the Schlussbericht, supra note 162.
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The GTZ project was quite entrepreneurial in developing and exe-
cuting a number of studies, policies, legislative projects,' 69 educational
programs, and public education campaigns. There were significant ex-
changes with experts from both countries.'7 ° Such cross-fertilization
grew further, with Chilean prosecutors visiting Paraguayan prosecutors
in Asunci6n to share common links and investigative techniques, as well
as visits to German institutions. In the last several years, GTZ has sup-
ported the democratization process in Chile, in part through a project for
the implementation of new criminal procedures and laws for prisoners'
rights. Legal and institutional foundations based on the rule of law are
being laid for modern criminal proceedings, which increase the predict-
ability of state actions and thus enable sounder individual and economic
decision-making.'
71
The technocrats at GTZ have also been asked to assist in the reform
of the civil procedure code, which is not unsurprising given the influence
of the German Civil Code in much of Latin America.' According to
Venezuelan lawyer Andr6s Bello (considered the father of the Chilean
Civil Code and others around the region), in his message of the Execu-
tive to Congress Proposing the Adoption of the Civil Code in 1857,
"[t]he arrangement that I have described resembles an institution that has
existed in some German states for a while. Other civilized nations aspire
to follow suit.'
73
GTZ has also enjoyed great success in developing and executing pro-
grams regarding the education of citizenry, prisoners' rights reform, and so
forth. GTZ has taken a lead in the criminal procedure reform, training a
majority of operators in the legal system, including Carabineros, Public
169. McHardy, supra note 159, at 26.
170. GTZ FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, § 2.4.
171. See Roland A. Cass, Judging: Norms and Incentives of Retrospective Decision-
Making, 75 B.U. L. Rev. 941 (1995). Cass explains that a "critical aspect of the commitment
to the rule of law ... is the promise that the government's force will be brought to bear on
individuals-especially in criminal proceedings.., only after fair warning." Id. at 954. This is
important because "[p]redictability allows adjustments of individual behavior that increase
societal well-being; increased predictability lowers costs associated with a decision." Id. at
960 (citation omitted).
172. For an examination of German civil law, see generally PETER L. MURRAY & ROLF
H. STURNER, GERMAN CIVIL JUSTICE (2004). The Civil Code of Germany, Buergeliches Ge-
setzbuch, was promulgated in 1900, during the Bismark Empire. ANGEL R. OQUENDO, LATIN
AMERICAN LAW 402 (2006) (citing Bernardino Bravo Lira, Civil Codification in Iberian
America and on the Iberian Peninsula (1827-1917): National v. Europeanized Law, in
FUENTES IDEOL6GICAS Y NORMATIVAS DE LA CODIFACION LATINOAMERICANA [IDEOLOGICAL
AND NORMATIVE SOURCES OF THE LATIN AMERICAN CODIFICATION] (1992)); see also KONRAD
ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOTZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 143 (Tony Weir trans.,
1998). For more about civil procedure reform in Chile, see Cooper, supra note 120.
173. OQUENDO, supra note 172, at 420 (citing ANDRtS BELLO, MESSAGE OF THE Ex-
ECUTIVE TO CONGRESS PROPOSING THE ADOPTION OF THE CIVIL CODE (1857)).
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Ministry and Justice Ministry officials, investigative police, prison au-
thorities, and the judiciary.14 As an example, GTZ enabled hundreds of
detectives from the Policfa de Investigaciones to train in Germany for
two weeks in order to share policing policies and preventive detention
procedures. GTZ also, in collaboration with Hamburg Police Chief
Reinhard Bromm, entered into a cooperation agreement between the
Hamburg Police and Carabineros; this agreement helped to train thou-
sands of Carabineros in Chile. Despite such successes, however, there
remain issues over whether the Carbineros and Public Ministry are
working well together, and whether the transition from the inquisitorial
model to adversarial model has been implemented successfully. Issues of
chain of custody of evidence, the responsibility for case management,
and common procedures for integrated services must also be addressed.
Too often, the Carabineros wish to prosecute the "old" way, by extract-
ing confessions.'
Even though there is no public defender institution in Germany,
GTZ also made inroads with the Public Defenders of Chile, developing
programming and educational materials on international human rights
law and on how to use it in Chilean judicial proceedings. 17 6 GTZ's publi-
cations included early works examining the need to move from theory to
practice, 7 and how to use alternative sentencing in the new criminal
procedures.'78 With the Public Ministry, GTZ published its evaluation of
the Chilean Criminal Procedure reform, even stating "from the perspec-
tive of the German system" in the title.'"9
174. GTZ FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, § 2.4. A cooperation agreement between the
Hamburg, Berlin, and Chilean police included visits for training and a cooperation agreement
between the Hamburg and Chilean district attorneys.
175. Meredith Fensom, Judicial Reform, Military Justice, and the Case of Chile's Carabin-
eros, INT'L L.Q., Summer 2007, at 1, 1-2, available at http://www.intemationallawsection.org/
modules/StaticDocs/data/International%20Law% 20Quarterly/2007070 lI LQ.pdf.
176. See, e.g., MANUAL DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL DE LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS
PARA DEFENSORES PENALES PUBLICOS [MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
FOR CRIMINAL PUBLIC DEFENDERS] (Centro de Documentaci6n Defensorfa Penal Ptiblica
2003).
177. See CECILIA POMAREDA DE ROSENAUER & JoRG ALFRED STIPPEL, EL NUEVO C6-
DIGO PROCEDIMIENTO PENAL. DE LA TEORfA A LA PRACTICA. A TRAVES DE CASOS
DESARROLLADOS [NEW CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE.
THROUGH DEVELOPED CASES] (2001).
178. PRINCIPIO DE OPORTUNIDAD Y SALIDAS ALTERNATIVAS AL JUICIO ORAL EN AMtRI-
CA LATINA [THE PRINCIPLE OF OPPORTUNITY AND ALTERNATIVE OUTCOMES TO TRIALS IN
LATIN AMERICA] (Jbrg Stippel & Adriin Marchisio eds., 2002).
179. EVALUACI6N DE LA REFORMA PROCESAL PENAL CHILENA DESDE LA PERSPECTIVA
DEL SISTEMA ALEM.N [EVALUATION OF THE CHILEAN PENAL REFORM FROM THE PERSPECTI-
VE OF THE GERMAN SYSTEM] (Andres Ritter, Detlev Achhammer & Hector Hemndez
Basualto eds., Socfedad Alemana de Cooperaci6n Tdcnica 2003).
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GTZ has also delved into the reform of Juvenile Law, promoting leg-
islation on rehabilitation and the better treatment of juveniles in criminal
procedures in accordance with the Chilean Constitution and the U.N.
Convention on the Rights of the Child.'80 This was a priority under both
the administration of Ricardo Lagos and that of Michelle Bachelet.'8 ' In
July 2004, GTZ brought Joachim Walter, Chief of the Youth Penitentiary
Center in Adelsheim, Germany, to Chile to work with the juvenile justice
legal reform project and with Chilean government authorities on prison
conditions for juvenile offenders. With this impetus, GTZ facilitated re-
form in the penitentiaries, leading legislative efforts to change the
treatment of juveniles, facilities for rehabilitation, and early intervention
and prevention programs. 8 2 The commission, made up of Jorg Stippel,
the Justice Ministry, and other experts, has presented its law to the Min-
ister of the Judicial Committee of the Chilean Congress. It is now a
priority of the government, and there is hope that a new law will soon be
making its way through the legislative process.1 83 German expertise once
again played a leadership role in shepherding legislation through Con-
gress, training legal sector operators, and creating binational cooperation
agreements between institutions to secure more sustainable efforts be-
yond the five-year life of the GTZ rule of law project.
Perhaps the most innovative part of the rule of law work done by
GTZ from January 2001 to December 2006 was in the area
of dissemination work. GTZ pioneered legal technology transfer by
co-producing a number of multimedia products. These projects included
180. See Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3; Esta-
blece un sistema de responsabilidad de los adolescentes por infracciones a la ley penal [Law
establishing a system of responsibility of juveniles for infractions of criminal law], Ley No.
20.084, Nov. 2, 2005, D. OFICIAL No. 38.778 (Chile).
181. Unicef.org, The Americas, http://www.unicef.org/say-yes/americas.htm (last visited
Aug. 16, 2008) (discussing how Richard Lagos launched the National Policy and Integrated
Plan of Action for Children and Adolescents). Under President Michelle Bachelet,
a new juvenile justice system reform law took effect. It establishes a more rehabili-
tative approach to juvenile delinquency and creates a specialized system of
detention facilities for minors. The law makes the government's National Children's
Service (SENAME) responsible for providing the necessary infrastructure and im-
plementing the reforms and the Gendarmerfa responsible for providing security for
the juvenile detention facilities. To meet these requirements, the government in-
vested more than $19 million (10 billion pesos) in programs and facilities.
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES 2007-CHILE, Mar.
11, 2008, available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2007/100632.htm.
182. See J6RG ALFRED STIPPEL, LAS CARCELES Y LA B6SQUEDA DE UNA POLfTICA
CRIMINAL PARA CHILE [PRISONS AND THE SEARCH FOR A CRIMINAL POLICY FOR CHILE]
(2006).
183. See Ministerio de Justicia [Ministry of Justice], http://www.minjusticia.cl (follow
"prioridades" hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 23, 2008) (Chile).
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CDs and DVDs containing information about law reforms partnered with
public institutions. Among other participants, these institutions included
the Public Ministry, the Public Defenders Office, 84 the Judicial Academy,
Carbineros, the National Commission on Youth, the Investigative Police,
the Goethe Institute, the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, and the Heidelberg
Center for Latin America.'85 Some of the footage was based on both
experiential learning and traditional lectures from workshops and
conferences held by GTZ and leading Chilean universities. International
conventions on human and civil rights were included, as was up-to-date
Chilean legislation. Additionally, GTZ partnered with a number of local
stakeholders and non-governmental organizations that worked in rule of
law promotion to educate the general public on the benefits of the rule of
law and the new legal reforms.
One of the most impressive parts of GTZ's operations was their rela-
tionship with the Coordinating Unit of the Criminal Procedure Reform
within the Chilean Ministry of Justice. In fact, GTZ's office was located
on the seventh floor of the Ministry of Justice building on Calle Moneda
on Constitution Square in downtown Santiago, right beside the interdis-
ciplinary Coordinating Unit dedicated to implementing the new criminal
procedures. Meanwhile, the U.S. Embassy worked in their compound
("el bunker"), and onerous security checks made meetings close to im-
possible (laptops and cellular telephones were banned from the
building). 86 Meetings had to take place at a nearby Starbucks to allow
for laptop computers.'87 Beyond budgeting differences-GTZ's budget
was far bigger and its programming far more consistent over several
years than the piecemeal approach of the U.S. Embassy-the dynamic of
proximity and programmatic planning further enabled GTZ to have di-
rect influence over many aspects of the criminal procedure itself and its
rollout around Chile.'88
184. See DEFENSORfA PENAL PUBLICA, MEMORIA ANUAL DEFENSORfA POBLICA [AN-
NUAL REPORT OF THE CRIMINAL PUBLIC DEFENDER] 136 (2005), available at http://
www.defensoriapenal.cl/interior/defensoria/cuenta.php.
185. GTZ FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, §§ 2.4-2.5.
186. Email from Norma de Solminihac, Cultural Affairs Section, Embassy of the United
States of America, Santiago, Chile (Apr. 23, 2008) (on file with the author); Email from
Norma de Solminihac, Cultural Affairs Section, Embassy of the United States of America,
Santiago, Chile (May 8, 2008) (on file with the author) [hereinafter Solminihac Email (May 8,
2008)].
187. Solminihac Email (May 8, 2008), supra note 186.
188. Since 2001, the German government was focused on cooperation with Chile on
modernization of the government and the protection of natural resources. See Auswirtiges
Amt-Chile: Bilaterale Beziehungen zu Deutschland [Foreign Office-Chile: Bilateral Rela-
tions with Germany], http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/de/Laenderinformationen/Chile/
Bilateral.html#t4 (last visited Sept. 12, 2008).
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German influence over Chilean legal culture also came from the
Konrad Adenauer Foundation (headquartered in Buenos Aires, Argentina,
and with offices in Santiago de Chile), which has funded research projects
on criminal procedural reform since 1997.89 Linked to a German political
party, its Rule of Law Program investigates criminal justice reform in
Latin America.' 90 The Foundation brought together legal scholars from
fifteen Latin American countries to prepare national reports for their own
jurisdictions. By March 2000, the panel had prepared a comparative
profile of the questionnaire data and held a conference with the Max
Planck Institute for Foreign and International Criminal Law at the
Albert-Ludwigs-Universitdt Freiburg (Freiburg University) to present the
results of the study.'9'
The Max Planck Institute has also played a role in developing aca-
demic relations with Latin American countries, including Chile.
Developed out of a 1938 seminar on foreign and international criminal
law at Freiburg University by Adolf Schinke, the Institute was created in
1954 as a public foundation of the Federal Republic of Germany, the
State of Baden-Wtirttemberg, and the University of Freiburg.' 92 In 1966,
the Institute was incorporated into the Max Planck Society, and in 1970,
the Institute started research in the field of criminology.' 93 Its Department
of Criminal Law focuses on German and foreign criminal law, criminal
procedure, law of penal administration, comparative criminal law, inter-
national cooperation in criminal matters (including the law of extradition
and the law of international mutual assistance), international criminal
law, criminal law problems in a reunified Germany, and a comparative
189. See, e.g., Arne Dettman, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung [Konrad-Adenauer Found.],
Strajjustizreform: Mehr Effizienz und Transparenz [Criminal Reform: More Efficiency and
Transparency] (June 17, 2005), available at http://www.kas.de/proj/home/pub/52/ I/year-
2005/dokumentid-6839/index.html (describing that the Konrad Adenauer Foundation sup-
ported the reform in a report published after the reform came into effect). That the leading
study on Chilean legal culture, Evoluci6n de la cultura juridica chilena [Evolution of the Chil-
ean Legal Culture], was published with funding from the Konrad Adenauer Foundation speaks
volumes about the influence the Germans have enjoyed in Chile. PEN A ET AL., supra note 6.
190. Max-Planck-Institut fir Auslandisches und Internationales Strafrecht [Max Planck
Institute for Foreign and International Criminal Law], Strafverfahrensreform in Lateinamerika
[Criminal Justice Reform in Latin America], http://www.mpicc.de/ww/en/pub/forschung/
forschungsarbeit/gemeinsame-projekte/archiv/strafverfahrensreform.htm (last visited Sept.
25, 2008).
191. See LAS REFORMAS PROCESALES PENALES EN AMKRICA LATINA [CRIMINAL JUSTICE
PROCEDURAL REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA] (Julio B.J. Maier et al. eds., 2000).
192. Max-Planck-lnstitut fuir Ausliindisches und Internationales Strafrecht [Max Planck
Institute for Foreign and International Criminal Law], Geschichte und Entstehung des Insti-
tutes [History and Development of the Institute], http://www.mpicc.de/ww/de/pub/
organisation/ueberblick/institutsgeschichte.htm (last visited Sept. 25, 2008).
193. Id.
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study of law and coming to terms with the past (after a regime change),
as well as law and medicine. 194
Along with these institutions, the University of Heidelberg has
opened its own campus in Chile, called the Heidelberg Center for Latin
America, in the Providencia neighborhood of Santiago. Programs in-
clude a Master's degree program (LL.M.) in International Law (with a
focus on investments, trade, and arbitration), in partnership with the In-
stitute of International Studies at the University of Chile and the Max
Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law.' 9
In addition to German university programs, German law professors
have long been popular in Chile. For example, Professor Kai Ambos is a
frequent visiting professor to Chile and the director of the law journal
Collecion de Derecho Penal.196 Additionally, German criminal law pro-
fessor Claus Roxin's work was cited in a petition for injunction to the
Court of Appeals of Santiago. 97 The popularity of German academicians
is part of the strong influence that German legal culture has played in
Chile over the years. Yet there have long been detractors as well. Andrds
Bello wrote:
We are too much under the influence of Europe. While we take
advantage of its culture, we should also imitate its independence
of thought ... Chilean youth, learn to judge for yourselves, as-
pire for independence of thought. This is the first philosophy
that we should learn from Europe. 9'
194. Max-Planck-Institut fUr Auslindisches und Internationales Strafrecht [Max Planck
Institute for Foreign and International Criminal Law], Abteilungen [Departments], http:l/
www.mpicc.de/ww/de/pub/organisation/wissenschaft/forschungsgruppen.htm (last visited
Sept. 25, 2008).
195. For further discussion, see Ruprecht-Karls-Universitdt Heidelberg, Masters of Laws
in International Law (LL.M.int) 2006, http://www.heidelberg-center.uni-hd.de/english/kurs_
master-jur_- 2006.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2008). A Master's degree in European Political
Studies and a Doctorate degree in Pharmacology are among the other offerings, in association
with the Catholic University of Chile. University of Heidelberg, Courses, http:ll
www.heidelberg-center.uni-hd.de/english/kurse.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2008).
196. See Vita Breve of Prof. Dr. Kai Ambos, available at http://lehrstuhl.jura.uni-
goettingen.de/kambos/PersonVita-english.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2008); see also Colec-
ci6n de Derecho Penal [Collection of Criminal Law], http://www.dpenal.clCDP/_main.htm
(last visited Sept. 25, 2008) (noting that the director of the Colecci6n de Derecho Penal is
Professor Kai Ambos).
197. Petition for Injunction, Honorable Court of Appeals, Santiago (Jan. 27, 2008),
available at http://www.memoriayjusticia.cl/english/en-docs-supreme.html.
198. Andrrs Bello, Modo de estudiar la historia [A Way to Study History], in OBRAS
COMPLETAS DE ANDRIS BELLO [COMPLETE WORKS OF ANDRIS BELLO] 124 (Ministerio de
Educaci6n [Ministry of Education] 1951) (1884).
[Vol. 29:501
The Battle of Chile
IV. U.S. INITIATIVES IN CHILE
It is not true that the United States feels any land hunger or en-
tertains any projects as regards the other nations of the Western
Hemisphere save such as are for their welfare. All that this coun-
try desires is to see the neighboring countries stable, orderly,
and prosperous. Any country whose people conduct themselves
well can count upon our hearty friendship. If a nation shows that
it knows how to act with reasonable efficiency and decency in
social and political matters, if it keeps order and pays its obliga-
tions, it need fear no interference from the United States.
-Theodore Roosevelt '99
Since the 1960s, law reform experts and legal educators from the
United States, through granting institutions, government programs, and
educational exchanges, have undertaken a number of initiatives to assist
Chile in rule of law promotion efforts.29 U.S. legal culture has had sig-
nificant influence on Chilean legal institutions, legal education, the legal
profession, the practice of law, and the rules that pervade the legal sys-
tem. Much of this influence occurred at a time when the U.S.
government funded a number of other projects around the developing
world.20 ' Lawyers from the American Society of International Law, the
Council on Foreign Relations, the American Bar Association, and the
U.S. government, as well as U.S. academicians and judicial administra-
tors, crisscrossed the globe to spread the seeds for positive change and
lay the foundations for modernization. The Law and Development
movement of that period was an effort to export a set of institutions and
practices intended to build the rule of law. 02 At that time, there was no
199. Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, Address to U.S. Congress (Dec. 6,
1904), available at http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/us-relations/roosevelt-corollary.htm.
200. Dezalay & Garth, supra note 39, at 307 (noting that "[l]aw in the United States
historically has been able-indeed expected and desired-to gain the position of setting the
key terms of legitimacy").
201. MIRow, supra note 64, at 168 (noting that the "twentieth century private law was
marked by significant indigenous legal development coupled with a long-term shift away from
European continental sources toward U.S. sources as important models for borrowing").
202. See John Henry Merryman, Comparative Law and Social Change: On the Origins,
Style, Decline & Revival of Law and Development Movement, 25 AM. J. COMP. L. 457, 461
(1977); Francis G. Snyder, Law & Development in the Light of Dependency Theory, 14 LAW
& Soc'y REV. 723, 728-29 (1980); David M. Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-
Estrangement: Some Reflections on the Crisis in Law and Development Studies in the United
States, 1974 Wis. L. REV. 1062, 1065 (1974); David M. Trubek, Toward a Social Theory of
Law: An Essay on the Study of Law and Development, 82 YALE L.J. 1 (1972). But see David
M. Trubek, Law and Development Then and Now, 90 AM. Soc'v INT'L L. 223 (1996) (arguing
a different view, which approved of a "new" law and development movement grounded in the
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real competition from Europe, which was preoccupied with putting its
economic house in order and integrating through the European Commu-
nities project."3
Legal education has long been a venue for work by U.S. educatorsS • 204
and development specialists . Professors from Stanford University Law
School led the way for U.S. influence in Chilean legal culture in the
2115 2061960s.0 5 Funded by the Ford Foundation, the Chile Law Program
showcased the Law and Development movement and was designed to
207
modernize Chilean legal education and legal research . Proposed re-
forms demonstrated various U.S.-style law school teaching methods
such as the Socratic method.
The classes took place at Stanford University for a total of sixteen
weeks: During the seminars, the Chilean scholars discussed assigned
readings and worked on a prospectus, incorporating the new methods
learned. 20 9 After the seminar ended, the Chilean scholars returned to their
respective law schools and continued to consult with a U.S. law profes-
sor. At the end of three years, the Chilean scholars established the
Instituto de Docencia y Investigaciones Jurfdicas in Santiago to ensure
that some of the initiatives in legal education would be sustained.
human rights "movement"); see also Carol V. Rose, The "New" Law and Development
Movement in the Post-Cold War Era: A Vietnam Case Study, 32 LAW & Soc'v REV. 93, 94
(1998) (criticizing "old" law and development for being "ethnocentric, naive, and imperialis-
tic").
203. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 11. During the period of time from 1958 through the 1970s, the European Economic
Community was growing in number and in breadth of control. For a concise, authoritative
synopsis of the amendments to the Treaty, see Europa, Treaty Establishing the European Eco-
nomic Community, http://europa.eu/scadplus/treaties/eecen.htm (last visited Sept. 25, 2008).
204. See generally LOWENSTEIN, supra note 137 (discussing the legal education in Chile
in the 1960s and 1970s); David S. Clark, The Idea of the Civil Law Tradition, in COMPARA-
TIVE AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN ON
HIS SEVENTIETH BIRTHDAY 11, 12 (David S. Clark ed., 1990) (arguing that legal education is
a natural place from which to influence legal cultures abroad and that '"jus commune was ex-
ported by the Spanish and the Portuguese to America in the sixteenth century, where it was
effectively disseminated through the universities established in the New World").
205. See Merryman, supra note 137, at 481. Professor Merryman was involved in two
"law and development" projects in Chile, one of which, "the Chile Law Program, had modest
ambitions and, until it fell victim to larger political events in Chile, promised to be modestly
effective .... The other was a quite different project with grander ambitions, called SLADE
(for Studies in Law and Development), that has yet to meet the expectations of those who
were involved in it." Id.
206. See FORD FOUND. MANY ROADS TO JUSTICE: THE LAW-RELATED WORK OF THE
FORD FOUNDATION GRANTEES AROUND THE WORLD 372 (Mary McClymont & Stephen
Golub eds., 2000).
207. See Merryman, supra note 137, at 486-89 (detailing Stanford's attempt at law re-
form in the 1960s and its program to train Chilean law professors).
208. Id. at 487.
209. ld. at 487-88.
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Although the seminars were considered useful by Chilean profes-
sors, the Chilean government under both Salvador Allende and General
Augusto Pinochet grew increasingly suspicious of U.S. involvement in
the law schools, 2'0 and government pressures forced the program to
close.2 ' Several scholars went on to incorporate what they learned into
their own courses, but the political climate did not allow for much pro-
gressive change in legal education.2 3 It is no surprise that the first Law
and Development movement waved the white flag soon thereafter.2 4 Ac-
cording to Dezalay and Garth, "[m]ost of the legal transplants either fail
outright or are largely unsuccessful, yet the process of transplanting con-
tinues apace-and has done so in varying degrees for centuries.'2 5 While
many of the proponents of the Law and Development movement contin-
ued their work in other arenas, mostly domestic, there were some who
continued to believe that modeling would work in the drive towards
modernization. Some critics of the movement lamented the quick with-
drawal.2 6
A second generation of the Law and Development movement began
with the end of the Argentine, Chilean, and Bolivian dictatorships and
the fall of Communism in Eastern and Central Europe in 1989 and in the
Soviet Union in 1991. This coincided with the return to the barracks of
the military across Latin America. In 1988, General Pinochet organized a
national referendum on the continuation of his regime. In advance of the
plebiscite, the U.S. Congress voted to give $1 million to the National
Endowment for Democracy for use in Chile, and the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) provided money for voter
210. Id. at 491.
211. For some analysts, a dictatorship should be no impediment to promoting the rule of
law. See Stephen Meili, Legal Education in Argentina and Chile, in EDUCATING FOR JUSTICE
AROUND THE WORLD: LEGAL EDUCATION, LEGAL PRACTICE AND THE COMMUNITY 138 (Jer-
emy Cooper & Louise G. Trubek eds., 1999) (exploring fieldwork observations of the teaching
of social justice in Argentine and Chilean law schools).
212. Merryman, supra note 137, at 495.
213. Cf Wilson, supra note 6, at 576-77 (attributing the success of Augusto Pinochet's
1973 coup d'tat to the "progressive, Socialist government that gave birth to, among other
things, social consciousness and a nascent law school clinical movement").
214. Dakolias, supra note 79, at 229-31 (distinguishing failed "law and development"
efforts transplanted by outsiders in Latin America in the 1960s and 1970s from internal "sec-
ond generation" judicial reform of the 1980s and 1990s that occurred when democracy was
more firmly rooted in the region and had a broad support base, and finding that current spe-
cific country-tailored efforts "have the potential to be successful in Latin America");
Merryman, supra note 202 (providing a eulogy of sorts for the Law and Development move-
ment); Trubek & Galanter, supra note 202; see also GARDNER, supra note 52, at 3.
215. DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 5, at 246.
216. See Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Lessons of Law-and-Development Studies, 89 AM. J.
INT'L L. 470 (1995).
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registration efforts.27 Having lost the referendum, General Pinochet left
the President's office, and military rule gave way to a democratically
elected coalition government in 1990.
In 1995, USAID contracted the Corporaci6n de Promoci6n Universi-
taria (CPU) in Chile to coordinate training of Chilean professionals in
Alternative Dispute Resolution, resulting in two mediation centers open-
ing in 1993.28 This collaboration lasted only until 1996, the year that
USAID pulled out of Chile,29 leaving the U.S. Embassy in Santiago with
the task of promoting reform. The Embassy has built on its focus since
1990 to include the strengthening of democratic institutions, with par-
ticular emphasis on the judicial system. Through 2005, the U.S.
Embassy poured $1 million into programs, including drafting the new
criminal procedure code (from 1995 to 1997) and subsequent training for
operators in the legal system.2
Initially, the U.S. government organized tours for judicial sector
members (judges, prosecutors, justice ministry officials) from Chile
through the U.S. Information Service and USAID. From 1990 to 1994,
the U.S. Embassy brought over thirty of these members, some of whom
grew to be influential in the criminal procedure reform. By 1995, the
U.S. Embassy focused its efforts on training, partnering with Fundaci6n
Paz Ciudadana and California Western School of Law's Proyecto
ACCESO221 to provide all members of the judicial sector with the skills
necessary to sustain the reform and ensure that new oral trials would be
implemented effectively. For the most part, a veteran of more than thirty
years in the diplomatic world of Chile, Monica Alcalde, shepherded pro-
jects as the U.S. Embassy's public affairs officers rotated in and out of
Santiago every three years. Some innovative, yet unsustainable, pro-
gramming came out of budgets provided by what is now the Bureau of
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs of the U.S.
Department of State.222 U.S. Embassy programming also included intro-
217. Barnes, supra note 105, at 169-70.
218. USAID, Alternative Dispute Resolution Activities in Latin America and the Caribbean,
http://www.usaid.govllocations/latin america-caribbean/democracy/adr/dg-conflict2b.htm (last
visited Sept. 25, 2008).
219. See USAID, REDUCING URBAN AND INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION IN CHILE (Dec.
2000), available at http://pdf.usaid.org/pdf-docs/pnacg6l9.pdf.
220. Interview with Monica Alcalde and Judith Baroody, Embassy of the United States
of America, Santiago, Chile (Mar. 1, 2007) (on file with the author); Email from Raul
Acevedo, Accounting Coordinator, Public Affairs Office, Embassy of the United States of
America, Santiago, Chile (Mar. 16, 2007) (on file with the author).
221. See Proyecto ACCESO, http://www.proyectoacceso.com (last visited Sept. 25,
2008); see generally James M. Cooper, Proyecto ACCESO: The Use of Popular Culture to
Build the Rule of Law in Latin America, 5 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 378 (2008).
222. Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, http://
www.state.gov/p/inl (last visited Aug. 14, 2008); see also U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 2007 CHILE
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ductions to mediation, arbitration, intellectual property rights enforce-
ment, judicial review, and some indigenous rights training. Much of
the time, an expert would be flown from the United States and shuttled
around Chile to speak to stakeholders, educate legal sector leaders, andc, • 224
provide introductions to their respective areas of expertise. Since 2005,
the programs at the U.S. Embassy have run on shoestring budgets out of
the U.S. Embassy in Santiago.225
With the consolidation of democratic governance in Chile through-
out the 1990s, academicians returned to Chile to continue work on legal
education development. Other U.S. law schools, such as American
University, California Western School of Law, and McGeorge School of
Law joined the earlier work undertaken by Stanford Law School and
developed programs in Chile. Indeed, legal education continues to be an
effective tool in spreading U.S. influence in legal cultures around Latin
America, partly funded privately by the elite in Chile, and partly pro-
vided for by U.S. taxpayers through the Fullbright Scholarship program.
This focus builds on the history and success of technocrats from
around Latin America trained in the discipline.2 7 These technocrats work
in Wall Street institutions, international financial institutions,228 and other
SECTION: INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT (Mar. 2, 2007), available
at http://www.usembassy.cl/ (follow "News Archive" hyperlink; then follow "Reports Pre-
pared by the U.S." hyperlink; then follow "2007 Chile Section" hyperlink) (last visited Sept.
12, 2008).
223. U.S. Dep't of State, Radio Broadcast, Dimensi6n Internacional: Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights (May 16, 2008), available at http://www.usembassy.cl/ (follow "News Archives"
hyperlink; then follow "Trade/Economy/Intellectual Property" hyperlink; then follow "Radio
Program: Intellectual Property Rights" hyperlink) (last visited Aug. 14, 2008); see also, REID,
supra note 7, at 28 (discussing the Latin American States' histories of borrowing and adapting
other regions' philosophical disciplines, "[f]rom the Jesuits and scholasticism, to liberalism
and positivism, corporatism and Marxism-and liberalism again-Latin American countries
have drawn from the same European political philosophies and often adapted them to the
conditions of the New World in similar ways" (citing HOWARD WIARDA, THE SOUL OF LATIN
AMERICA: THE CULTURAL AND POLITICAL TRADITION (2001)).
224. See Intellectual and Industrial Property Rights are being Analyzed by U.S. Special-
ists With Chilean Judges in Iquique and Valparaiso, http://www.usembassy.cl/ (follow "News
Archive" hyperlink; then follow "Embassy Activities outside of Santiago" hyperlink; then
follow "Intellectual and Industrial Property Rights are being Analyzed by U.S. Specialists
With Chilean Judges in Iquique and Valparaiso" hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 12, 2008).
225. CAROTHERS, supra note 19, at 170 (finding that the results of U.S. efforts to pro-
mote rule of law reform have been disappointing, the projects, "launched with enthusiasm-
and large budgets-in the late 1980s and early 1990s have fallen far short of their goals").
226. See generally Meili, supra note 211, at 138; Janet Ellen Steams, Reflections on
Teaching in Chile, 48 J. LEGAL EDUC. 110 (1998).
227. See Dezalay & Garth, supra note 39, at 312 ("Within the countries that are the lead-
ing global producers of the rule of law, above all the United States, the prevailing hierarchy of
professions and disciplines therefore plays a major role in warding off scrutiny of the produc-
tion and legitimation of law itself.").
228. SLAUGHTER, supra note 43, at 5.
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powerhouses of finance. 29 There is also competition to educate the tech-
nocrats in a certain way of thinking, not unlike the Chilean economists
called "the Chicago Boys., 230 These kinds of groups, according to Anne-
Marie Slaughter, form networks capable of producing a "transnational
consensus on specific rules and approaches., 23' They also promote free
market economics, focus on strengthening judicial procedures, and en-
sure corporate law rights like shareholder remedies, repatriation of
profits, and the protection of industrial property.32 Other technocratic
groups promote the practice of international commercial law in the form
of large corporate law firms, a fixture in the United States and another
manifestation of the influence of U.S. legal culture:
The proliferation and growth of business law firms appears to be
the most successful or even the only successful legal transplant
from the north into the south. This success is even more striking
because of the strong European legal traditions-or legal
229. Drake, supra note 48, at xix (discussing the impact that "money doctors" have had
on "complex domestic groups, power relations, government, and national developments within
the recipient countries," including promotion of the "concentration, urbanization, and institu-
tionalization of Latin American economies along paths previously traveled by the United
States," allowing the republics to become "more deeply integrated into twentieth-century
world capitalism, their economies more articulated and differentiated as local elites respond to
external opportunities").
230. Dezalay & Garth, supra note 39, at 309 (categorizing those who "analyze these
debates and activities concerning the production of national and transnational rules and con-
vert them into scholarly theories and descriptions" as "actors in the production of governing
rules" and "participants in the contests of expertise and value").
231. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Breaking Out: The Proliferation of Actors in the Interna-
tional System, in GLOBAL PRESCRIPTIONS, supra note 39, at 12, 19. In another work, Slaughter
elaborates,
Each of these networks has specific aims and activities, depending on its subject
area, membership, and history, but taken together, they also perform certain com-
mon functions. They expand regulatory reach, allowing national government
officials to keep up with corporations, civic organizations, and criminals. They
build trust and establish relationships among their participants that then create in-
centives to establish a good reputation and avoid a bad one. These are the
conditions essential for long-term cooperation. They exchange regular information
about their own activities and develop databases of best practices, or, in the judicial
case, different approaches to common legal issues. They offer technical assistance
and professional socialization to members from less developed nations, whether
regulators, judges, or legislators.
SLAUGHTER, supra note 43, at 3-4.
232. DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 5, at 28 (linking economists from Chile, Mexico,
Argentina, and Brazil to each other and to the United States through their education, friend-
ship, and approach to economic problems, and noting that "[t]heir careers even overlap
through comparable service in the international financial institutions or as visiting or even
tenure-track professors in the United States").
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culture-in Latin America, which assigned a marginal role to
lawyers who were identified in business.233
Still other U.S. groups promote the protection of fundamental human
rights, the right to a fair trial, and the presumption of innocence.2 14 It is
these latter groups that have attracted the continued interest of the Ford
Foundation, although its role in legal reform in Chile is quite limited.
The Ford Foundation's mission is to strengthen democratic values, re-
duce poverty and injustice, promote international cooperation, and
advance human achievement.2 ' From its headquarters for the Andean
Region and Southern Cone in Santiago, the Ford Foundation funds pro-
jects that seek to strengthen democratic institutions and practices
through research, advocacy, and the promotion of rights, particularly
related to equity, non-discrimination, and access to education and
knowledge. 36
Building on the Ford Foundation's early support of legal clinics, a
number of U.S. philanthropic foundations have funded efforts in Latin
America, and in Chile in particular, to promote law reform and the
strengthening of the rule of law.238 From 1998 to 2005, the William and
Flora Hewlett Foundation had a U.S.-Latin America program with a ro-
bust set of initiatives in Chile.239 At this time, the mission of the
Foundation's U.S.-Latin American Relations Program was to improve
relations among institutions, individuals, and communities in the Ameri-
cas in order to promote democratic governance, economic growth with
equity, and environmentally sustainable development .24  The Hewlett
233. Id. at 198; Kelemen & Sibbitt, supra note 22, at 132 (recognizing "a transnational
force-American law firms-which accelerated the globalization of American law in the areas
where they were active by spreading their practices and pressuring foreign legal service indus-
tries to adopt them"); see also Mark Galanter, Mega-Law and Mega-Lawyering in the
Contemporary United States, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF THE PROFESSIONS: LAWYERS, DOCTORS,
AND OTHERS 152-76 (Robert Dingwall & Phillip Lewis eds., 1983).
234. See DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 5, at 30 (crediting the "proliferating actors"
with the ability to produce "a new law that brings new legal standards for the protection of the
environment and for the promotion of human rights"); Dezalay & Garth, supra note 39, at 315
(acknowledging a resistance to these legal reforms).
235. FORD FOUND., FORD FOUNDATION ANNUAL REPORT 2005 70 (2005), available at
http://www.fordfound.org/pdfs/impact/ar2005.pdf.
236. Ford Foundation, Andean Region and Southern Cone, http://www.fordfound.org/
regions/andeanregion/overview (last visited Aug. 16, 2008).
237. See Wilson, supra note 6, at 555.
238. For example, the Tinker Foundation of New York funded projects with Fundaci6n
Paz Cuidadana. See COMUNA SEGURA, COMPROMISO 100: DOCUMENTO DESCRIPrivo FASE
UNo-2001 (2001), available at http://www.pazciudadana.cl/upload/areas-infoestrategia/
PAZ-ESTRATEGIA20071114122629.pdf.
239. WILLIAM AND FLORA HEWLETT FOUNDATION, 1999 ANNUAL REPORT 86 (1999),
available at http://www.hewlett.org/AboutUs/AnnualReports/ 999AnnReport.htm.
240. See id.
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Foundation was focused on continued hemispheric integration and in-
vested in integrated institutional and human-resource infrastructure in
order to develop beneficial relations throughout the Hemisphere. 4' Prior-
ity regions of focus were Mexico, the U.S.-Mexico border region,
Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. By 2003, the Hewlett Foundation began to
withdraw from activities in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile and roll its pro-
gram into other programs, including Mexican judicial reform and
Brazilian air quality projects. Grants concerning rule of law and judicial
reform were given to public universities like the University of Chile, in-
dependent non-profits in Chile, and private-public university
partnerships like the Catholic University of Chile (with California West-
ern School of Law) and Universidad Alberto Hurtado (with San Diego
State University). The Hewlett Foundation supported legal scholarship
on indigenous rights 242 and Alternative Dispute Resolution. 243 It also2 241
funded books on evidence2 and law reviews on criminal procedure.245
As yet another form of U.S. legal involvement in Chile, there have
also been summer programs for U.S. law students in Chile organized by
American University's Washington College of Law, Valparaiso Univer-
sity Law School,246 and a LatCRIT consortium that featured a short
workshop in Santiago de Chile247 and the Consortium for Innovative Le-
gal Education!" Stanford University still has a program that brings
Chileans to the United States, as do Yale University, Harvard University,
and New York University.249 Loyola Chicago Law School and McGeorge
241. Id.
242. For an example of such scholarship, see generally RODRIGO LILLO ET AL., RESOLU-
c16N DE CONFLICTOS EN EL DERECHO MAPUCHE: UN ESTUDIO DESDE LA PERSPECTIVA DEL
PLURALSMO JURIDICO [CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN MAPUCHE LAW: A STUDY FROM THE PERS-
PECTIVE OF LEGAL PLURALISM] (Universidad Cat6lica de Temuco 2003).
243. For an example, see generally Centro de Resoluci6n Alternativa de Conflictos [Cen-
ter for Alternative Dispute Resolution], 4 REVISTA CREA (2003).
244. For an example, see generally RODRIGO COLOMA CORREA, LA PRUEBA EN EL NUE-
VO PROCESO PENAL ORAL [THE TEST OF THE NEW ORAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE] (2003).
245. See generally Universidad Cat6lica de Temuco: Escuela de Derecho [Temuco Cat-
holic University: Law School], 3 REVISTA DE DERECHO (2002).
246. Valparaiso University School of Law, Summer Overseas Program, http://
www.valpo.edu/law/registrar/summeraway.php (last visited Mar. 22, 2008).
247. See LatCrit, Critical Global Classroom, http://www.latcrit.org/ (last visited Sept. 10,
2008) (providing an overview of the program). The LatCrit Critical Global Classroom was
cancelled in 2006. Id.
248. See California Western School of Law Chile Summer Program 2008, http://
www.cwsl.edu/StudyAbroad/chile/web/index.htm (last visited May 15, 2008).
249. David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies, Harvard University, Mission,
http://www.drclas.harvard.edu/regional-office/about/mission (last visited Aug. 16, 2008); New
York University, Law Global, http://www.law.nyu.edu/global/index.htm (last visited Aug. 16,
2008) (discussing the more than 300 international students and various international professors
and judges who come to New York University School of Law to study and teach); Stanford
University, Center for Latin American Studies, http://www.stanford.edu/group/las/about/
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Law School organized a basic workshop on oral advocacy training, 50
while California Western School of Law trained almost every public de-
fender and many prosecutors and judges in basic and advanced oral
advocacy skills.2 5' New initiatives from California Western School of
Law pushed second-generation reforms that introduce judicial innova-
252tions like DNA testing, computer forensics, digital evidence, drug
treatment courts,253 and problem-oriented policing.254
In essence, the work of the U.S. academic institutions has been to
promote reform, provide exchanges with students in both countries, and
create activists within the Chilean legal sector to sustain reform efforts.255
As stated by Thomas Carothers,
Probably the most significant accomplishment of U.S. rule-of-
law assistance in Latin America since the mid-1980s has been to
help push the issue onto the agendas of governments in the
region. The goal of improving courts, police, and other basic
law-related institutions now stirs up public debate and
galvanizes officials' attention. The reasons for this agenda shift
are many-citizens' frustration over skyrocketing crime is one
major factor-but the U.S. emphasis is certainly one of them.
index.html (last visited June 20, 2008) (discussing, among other things, the Tinker Visiting
Professor Program, of which Chilean scholars have been a part); Yale Law School, Latin
America, http://www.law.yale.edu/academics/internationallaw-latinamerica.asp (last visited
Aug. 16, 2008).
250. See generally Loyola University Chicago, Academics, Cooperative Program with
Chile, http://www.luc.edulaw/academics/specialstudyabroad/chile-cooperative-pr.html (last
visited Aug. 16, 2008) (discussing Loyola's cooperative program with Chile); see also Univer-
sity of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, Fred A. Galves, http://www.mcgeorge.edu/
x498.xml (last visited Aug. 16, 2008) (discussing Professor Galves's teaching experience with
foreign law students, including trial advocacy with Chilean prosecutors and defenders).
251. See generally ACCESO Capacitaci6n, Oral Advocacy Workshop, http://
www.proyectoacceso.com/web/guest/programs/capacitacion/oabas (last visited Aug. 16,
2008); see also Matt Moffett, Shoeshine Boys in La Paz Need a Good Lawyer, WALL ST. J.
ONLINE, May 8, 2008, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 121010759340771687.html.
252. See Proyecto ACCESO, Inocente Project, http://www.proyectoacceso.com/web/
guest/news/inocente (last visited Mar. 24, 2008).
253. See James Cooper, Drug Treatment Courts: A Problem-Solving Mechanism to Ad-
dress the Demand Side of the War on Drugs, in JUSTICIA PENAL Y ADICCIONES: TRIBUNALES
DE TRATAMIENTO CoMo ALTERNATIVA A LA SANCI6N [CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND ADDICTIONS:
TREATMENT TRIBUNALS AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO PUNISHMENT] 13 (Paula Hurtado & Angel
Valencia eds., 2007).
254. Subsecretarfa de Carabineros [Undersecretary of Police], Gobierno y Carabineros
de Chile Realizan Seminario Sobre Programa "Policfa Orientada a la Soluci6n de Problemas
(POP)" [Chilean Governor and Police Attend Seminar on "Problem Oriented Policing (POP)"]
(May 2, 2007), available at http://www.subsecar.cl/noticias/noticial82.php.
255. See Sieder, Schjolden & Angell, supra note 50, at 1-2 (noting the amount of sup-
port that "[n]ongovernmental agencies and networks of activist lawyers are [offering to
advance] such processes of legal mobilization" and the role legal globalization is playing in
the developments).
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Getting the issue onto the agenda is much less than what aid
providers have sought to accomplish, but in the long run it may
prove an important contribution if Latin American governments
and societies are able to sustain their efforts and make some
256lasting progress.
Indeed, U.S. legal culture has had a significant impact on the legal
reform process in Chile and on the construction of a new legal culture in
the post-Pinochet era. Yet, there have been significant challenges to U.S.
influence on Chilean legal reform. First, there is the lingering issue of
U.S. involvement in plotting the coup d'dtat, or at least tacitly supporting
it, against the democratically elected government of Salvador Allende in
1973.257 In 2003, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell issued an apol-
ogy.58 There is also the knock-on effect of anti-globalization protests that
have swept Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, and other countries around the
region, inspired by Cuba and Venezuela."' Chilean protestors took to the
streets in droves to protest globalization and the visit of U.S. President
George W. Bush during the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)
summit in Santiago in 2004.260 There is also lingering resentment over
strong-arm diplomacy concerning the Chilean vote for a U.N. Security
Council resolution in support of the invasion of Iraq by the United States
and its allies.26' The backdrop to these challenging times for the pre-
dominance of U.S. legal culture in Chile has been the general decline of
the United States' influence in the face of the ascending influence of the
'62European Union and its Member States.
256. CAROTHERS, supra note 19, at 171.
257. See generally SIMON COLLIER & WILLIAM F. SATER, A HISTORY OF CHILE: 1808-
2002 330-52 (2d ed. 2004); JAMES F. PETRAS & MORRIS H. MORLEY, How ALLENDE FELL: A
STUDY IN U.S.-CHILEAN RELATIONS (1974).
258. Larry Rohter, Thousands Demonstrate Against Bush in Santiago, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
20, 2004, at A8.
259. See generally TARIQ ALl, PIRATES OF THE CARIBBEAN: Axis OF HOPE (Verso 2006).
260. See Hector Tobar, Activists Await Bush at Pacific Summit in Chile, L.A. TIMES, Nov.
18, 2004, at A3.
261. Colum Lynch, U.S. Pushed Allies on Iraq, Diplomat Writes: Chilean Envoy to U.N.
Recounts Threats of Retaliation in Run-Up to Invasion, WASH. POST, Mar. 23, 2008, at Al 1.
262. KAGAN, supra note 13, at 60 (exploring the global implications of Europe's unique
approach and why it views U.S. unilateralism as a threat and stating that "many Europeans,
including many in positions of power, routinely apply Europe's experience to the rest of the
world, and sometimes with the evangelic zeal of converts").
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V. COMPETITION OR CONVERGENCE: EUROPEAN AND U.S.
LEGAL CULTURES IN THE ERA OF GLOBALIZATION
The 1990s saw a prolonged period of legal harmonization, most of-
ten punctuated by international agreements. 263 This resulted in increased
competition between the legal cultures of the United States and
Europe.' 6 As countries reform their laws, they choose which foreign
dh 265
rules to adopt and/or adapt domestically and which to ignore. For in-
stance, this contest has manifested itself in the arena of health and safety
standards, with disputes over whose regulations concerning hormones in
beef and genetically modified organisms are better.266
The battle has also played out in competition law.267 When General
Electric and Honeywell attempted a merger in 2001, General Electric
stood to reap the benefits of a $45 billion deal. The U.S. Department of
Justice approved the match, but antitrust authorities in the European
263. See generally Friedman, supra note 37.
264. ELLEN MEIKSINS WOOD, EMPIRE OF CAPITAL 143 (2005) (announcing that, "[flor
the first time in the history of the modem nation state, the world's major powers are not en-
gaged in direct geopolitical and military rivalry" but are instead competing in the "capitalist
manner"); Sylvia Ostry, Policy Approaches to System Friction: Convergence Plus, in NA-
TIONAL DIVERSITY AND GLOBAL CAPITALISM, supra note 42, at 333, 338 (theorizing that
"[olne way of reducing system friction and of achieving a level playing field, or fairness (a
powerful factor in American economic and foreign policy), is to harmonize, that is, to estab-
lish one brand of capitalism" (emphasis in original)).
265. Cotterrell, supra note 28, at 78 (explaining how lawmakers choose to adopt laws
from sophisticated and prestigious sources); see also Rene David, A Civil Code for Ethiopia:
Considerations on the Codification of Civil Law in African Countries, 37 TUL. L. REV. 187,
188 (1963) (offering another explanation for how and why countries mix and match foreign
law, that is, "[i]t is probable that the final decision was motivated not so much for juridical
arguments as by considerations of a political or cultural order: the desire to counter-balance,
by an appeal to other sources, an English or Anglo-American influence which they feared was
becoming excessive").
266. See At Daggers Drawn, ECONOMIST, May 8, 1999, at 17; see also Paul Geitner &
Andrew Pollack, A Line In the Sand Over WTO's Modified-Food Ruling, INT'L HERALD TRIB-
UNE, Feb. 9, 2006, at Finance 3, (arguing that the World Trade Organization's (WTO)
determination that the European Union had breached trade regulations, while resolving the
suit brought by the United States, Canada, and Argentina, would do little to harmonize
U.S.-E.U. perceptions of genetically modified foods); US Hits EU, Spares UK in Beef War,
BBC ONLINE NETWORK, July 19, 1999, http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/business/the-economy/
398526.stm (describing retaliatory import tariffs-approved by the WTO due to the European
Union's ban on hormone-treated beef-levied by the United States on various E.U. products);
WTO To Rule Against EU In Beef Hormone Case, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 28, 2008, avail-
able at http://www.digtriad.comnews/local/article.aspx?storyid= 100723.
267. Paul Meller, Microsoft Lashes Out at European Regulator, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16,
2006, at C5; see also Mariah Blake, Europe Faults Apple for "Anticompetitive" iPhone Deals,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 23, 2007, at 6 (characterizing the iPhone conflict as "another
sign of the increasingly proactive approach European courts and government agencies are
taking when it comes to regulating competition-a fact illustrated most vividly by the recent
European Union court decision that forced Microsoft to unbundle its Media Player from its
operating system").
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Commission held it up.26t According to U.S. Treasury officials, the failed
merger cost an estimated $75 million.269 On other occasions, the long
reach of U.S. legislation has impacted German corporate governance and
management-labor relations. In particular, the provisions of the Sar-
banes-Oxley Act (disallowing employees from being corporate directors)
run completely counter to the role of trade unions in German corporate
laws, wherein employees must be members of corporate boards.2 70 As the
WTO negotiates how to address competition law, the contest between the
U.S. and European approaches will grow stronger.27
The competition among legal cultures is part of the increasing reali-
zation that models developed in and by the United States are no longer
the only models by which to advance a democratic society and the rule
of law.272 For Robert Kagan, the United States remains "mired in his-
tory," exercising its power in a world in which security and liberty are
still dependant on the possession and use of military might.273 Europe, on
the other hand, has moved into a "post-historical paradise," where peace
and prosperity can be secured through laws, rules, and negotiations.274
268. See Thomas J. Horton & Stefan Schmitz, Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP, A
Tale of Two Continents: The Coming Clash of the Conflicting Economic Viewpoints in Europe
and the United States, Feb. 17, 2007 (on file with the author).
269. See, e.g., EU Kills GE-Honeywell, CNN MONEY, July 3, 2001, http:/
money.cnn.com/2001/07/03/europe/ge-eu/ (assessing the financial ramifications of the Euro-
pean Union's rejection of the merger for both companies and investors); see also Yeo Jin
Chun, GE-Honeywell Merger Debacle: The Enforcement of Antitrust Competition Laws
Across the Atlantic Pond, 15 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 61 (2002); Paul Jin, Turning Competition on
its Head: Economic Analysis of the EC's Decision to Bar the GE-Honeywell Merger, 23 Nw.
J. INT'L L. & Bus. 187 (2002); Thomas L. Ruffner, The Failed GE/Honeywell Merger: The
Return of Portfolio-Effects Theory?, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 1285 (2003).
270. For an examination of the differences between U.S. and German corporate govern-
ance, see Theodore Baums & Kenneth E. Scott, Taking Shareholder Protection Seriously?
Corporate Governance in the United States and Germany, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 31 (2005);
Cooper, supra note 40.
271. See Cooper, supra note 40.
272. SLAUGHTER, supra note 43, at 156 (proposing that the European Union has found
its alternative in the "'transnational option'-the use of an organized network of national
officials of member-states to ensure 'that the actors in charge of the implementation of Com-
munity policies behave in a similar manner'" (citing Renaud Dehousse, Regulation by
Networks in the European Community: The Role of European Agencies, 4 J. EUR. PUB. POL'Y
254 (1997)).
273. KAGAN, supra note 13, at 3.
274. Id. Notwithstanding the much trumpeted end of Europe with the popular defeat of
the European Constitution in France and the Netherlands, the European Union is not going
away. See generally Elaine Sciolino, French Voters Soundly Reject European Union Constitu-
tion, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2005, at Al; Doug Saunders, European Disarray Spreads After
Vote, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, June 1, 2005, at Al.
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European power is now about using its soft power-the ability to track
and persuade.275
The European Union dispenses more international aid to more coun-
tries in the developing world than the United States.276 Europe has more
27278 279 moevtsiineainlpeople,277 more money, more trade, and more votes in international
organizations.2 '0 Europe has even begun to compete for greater control
over the governance of the Internet.' Moreover, Europe's currency is
challenging the hegemony of the U.S. dollar in international financial
dealings. According to Russell A. Berman,
The advent of a new global currency based on a European econ-
omy as large as that of the United States clearly indicates that
the international monetary system will look very different in the
21 st century than it did in the dollar-dominated world of the 20th
century or the sterling-dominated world of the 19th century.
2 82
275. Soft power is something with which the United States won the Cold War but then
later discarded in favor of military and economic might. See JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., SOFT POWER:
THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD POLITICS (2004).
276. See Europa, Overviews of the European Union Activities: Development, http://
europa.eu/pol/dev/overviewen.htm (last visited Sept. 12, 2008) (finding that "[miore than
half the money spent to help poor countries comes from the European Union and its member
states, making it the world's biggest aid donor").
277. There is evidence that Europe's population is decreasing due to the declining birth-
rate. Cf. Joseph Chamie, Angela Merkel and the Decline of Europe, GLOBALIST, Oct. 13, 2005,
available at http://www.theglobalist.com/DBWeb/StoryId.aspx?StoryId=4783.
278. Kate Hammer & Julia Werdigier, Money Goes Far in New York, If You're European,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2007, at C1 (reporting that due to the effects of a cheap dollar, "many
Europeans are looking at the United States the way some Americans have long viewed Latin
America and the Caribbean and, once upon a time, Europe-a cheap place to flex their strong
currency"); see Dollar Hits New Low Against the Euro, MSNBC.coM, Mar. 7, 2008, http://
www.msnbc.msn.con/id/2336847 l/.
279. European Commission, Bilateral Trade Relations, Chile, http://ec.europa.eu/
trade/issues/bilateral/countries/chile/index-en.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2008) ("Chile's main
trade partner is the [European Union]. The [European Union] is also Chile's main provider of
foreign direct investment (FDI), both in terms of flows and stocks.").
280. Yet, Member States of the European Union keep their separate votes in certain in-
ternational organizations, such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD), the United Nations, the WTO, and even the International Standards
Organization. Mattli & Buthe, supra note 42, at 1.
281. See Liza Porteus, Who Should Control the Internet, FoxNEws.coM, Nov. 10, 2005,
available at http://www.foxnews.comstory/0,2933,175096,00.html; Aoife White, EU Wants
Shared Control of Internet, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 30, 2005, available at http://
www.breitbart.com/article.php?id=D8CUKA481&show-article=l; see also US v. EU on
Internet Control, CBS NEWS, Sept. 30, 2005, available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/
2005/09/30/tech/main892400.shtml.
282. C. Fred Bergsten, The Euro and the Dollar: Toward a "Finance G-2"?, in THE
EURO AT FIVE: READY FOR A GLOBAL ROLE? 27 (Adam S. Posen ed., 2005).
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With this new clout, E.U. officials have come out strongly to ad-
vance the European Union as the model for governance. 283 As then-
European Commission President Romano Prodi stated, "Europe has a
role to play in world 'governance,' a role based on replicating the Euro-
pean experience on a global scale. 2M The Europeans believe that they
have a better set of solutions for the rest of the world. As Robert Kagan
has explained:
[t]he transmission of the European miracle to the rest of the
world has become Europe's new mission civilisatrice. Just as
Americans have always believed that they had discovered the se-
cret to human happiness and wished to export it to the rest of the
world, so Europeans have a new mission born of their own dis-
216
covery of perpetual peace.
A bastion of bureaucracy,287 the European Union also enjoys compli-
cated government and regulation.28 1 "Eurocrats ' 289 take pride in their
social compact, their health and safety standards, their way of life, and
283. RUSSELL A. BERMAN, ANTI-AMERICANISM IN EUROPE: A CULTURAL PROBLEM 77
(2004) (identifying Anti-Americanism as "an ideology to form a postnational European iden-
tity.., it is endogenous: not a response to an outside threat but an aspect of European political
and cultural transformation. For the European Union to be credible, it has to carry some mean-
ing and stand for more than a bureaucratic apparatus").
284. KAGAN, supra note 13, at 60 (concerning divergent U.S. and European views to-
ward international law and institutions); see also MARK LEONARD, WHY EUROPE WILL RUN
THE 21ST CENTURY (2005) (arguing that the European Union's "network" model is a more
ideal form of organization and that the European Union's track record in democratizing and
liberalizing Central and Eastern Europe is emblematic of its success as a model).
285. SCHNABEL & ROCCA, supra note 17, at xxi-xxii; Stefan A. Schirm, Europe's Com-
mon Foreign and Security Policy: The Politics of Necessity, Viability, and Adequacy, in THE
EUROPEAN UNION IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY 78 (Carolyn Rhodes ed., 1998) (suggesting
that an E.U. foreign policy goal of the promotion of democracy could "contribute to creating a
European identity and thus further the European integration process").
286. KAGAN, supra note 13, at 61; Gorm Rye Olsen, The European Union: An Ad Hoc
Policy with a Low Priority, in EXPORTING DEMOCRACY 131, 131 (Peter J. Schraeder ed., 2002)
(ranking E.U. desire to export democratic values low on the list of priorities, giving way to
"more traditional foreign policy goals, such as ensuring the military security and economic
well-being of E.U. Members").
287. Alexei Barrionuevo, Land of Babble: As Europe Seeks A Stronger Voice, Words Get
in Way; New Entrants Stretch Limits of EU's Polyglot Approach; 380 Language Pairs Served;
Malta's Translator Shortage, WALL. ST. J., Jan. 5, 2005, at A 1.
288. BERMAN, supra note 283, at 10 (characterizing the system in the European Union as
a "democracy deficit" because the "political powers have been shifted to a bureaucracy largely
shielded from public scrutiny and electoral control"); Volkmar Gessner, The Transformation of
European Legal Cultures, in EUROPEAN LEGAL CULTURES, supra note 19, at 513, 514 (finding
no evidence of a unified European legal culture on which to base "E.C. Law").
289. See Eurocrats Unite!, TIME, Mar. 13, 1964, available at http://www.time.com/time/
magazine/article/0,9171,828285,00.html.
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the civil society they have built.9° Since it was founded in 1957 with the
291Treaty of Rome, the European Union has focused on legal harmoniza-
tion through the proliferation of multilateral decision-making institutions
292
and international agreements so as to build a supranational State. Notes
Jeremy Rifkin,
The [European Union]'s very legitimacy lies not in the control of
territory or the ability to tax its citizens or mobilize police or the
military force to exact obedience but, rather, in a code of con-
duct, conditioned by universal human rights and operationalized
through statutes, regulations, and directives and, most important,
by a continuous process of engagement, discourse, and negotia-
tion with multiple players operated at the local, regional,
national, transnational and global levels.293
While it is clear that the United States and many of the Member
States of the European Union have diverged in their policies concerning21429
Iraq, how to enforce U.N. Security Council sanctions, and the
broader war on terror,96 some observers have also signaled a divergence
in terms of values.297 This divergence has been attended by a growing
290. David Brooks, Sustaining the European Way of Life, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE,
June 3, 2005, at B8 (confirming that the traditional U.S. liberal's wishlist has been largely
enacted in Europe, "generous welfare measures, ample labor protections, highly progressive
tax rates, single-payer health care systems, zoning restrictions to limit big retailers and cradle-
to-grave middle class subsidies supporting everything from child care to pension security").
291. See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, supra note 203.
292. Cf Saunders, supra note 274.
293. JEREMY RIFKIN, THE EUROPEAN DREAM 209 (2004).
294. ALBERTO ALESINA & FRANCESCO GIAVAZZI, THE FUTURE OF EUROPE: REFORM OR
DECLINE 1 (2007) (attributing the "cross-Atlantic animosity" not only to animosity toward
President Bush, or to U.S. irritation with French and German policies on Iraq, but more to the
growing differences between the regions); BARK, supra note 15, at 211-12 (reporting on how
the German campaigns of Chancellor Gerhard Schr6der and Minister of Justice Herta Daub-
ler-Gmelin focused on President George W. Bush's Iraq war policies); KAGAN, supra note 13,
at 37 (explaining how divergent the views of the European Union and the United States are on
the issue of Iraq, and, more broadly, on the issue of how to govern and about "the role of in-
ternational institutions, about the proper balance between the use of force and the use of
diplomacy in international affairs").
295. Steven R. Weisman, Europe Resists U.S. Push to Curb Iran Ties, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
31, 2007, at Al. The tension was even displayed by the tepid U.S. support for Germany's
attempt to secure a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council. See Glenn Kessler, Rice
Pans Handing Germany Permanent U.N. Council Slot, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, May 19,
2005, at A 13.
296. Jan Silva, EU Lawmakers Demand Answers on Possible CIA Secret Prisons, SAN
DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, Dec. 2, 2005, at A]5.
297. STEPHEN E SZABO, PARTING WAYS: THE CRISIS IN GERMAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS
137 (2004) (noting that, "[aill the shared values and the extensive economic network that
bound the United States and Europe could not prevent the astonishingly rapid deterioration of
relations between nations that had been close allies for fifty years"); Press Release, Office of
the Press Secretary, President Hosts United States-European Union Summit, June 20, 2005,
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anti-Americanism that has proven useful in the gradual definition of a
new European identity.29 8 This ideology of anti-Americanism has been
the focal point for manifestations of Europe's divergence from the
United States.299 At times, even European leaders do not know if Europe
is a competitor to the United States or an ally.3°° This competition, how-
ever, has greatly dissipated from previous levels, with the exit of Gerhard
Schr5der from Germany's leadership and the arrival of Angela Merkel. 0'
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/06/20050620-19.html. U.S.
President George W. Bush stated that "relations with Europe are important relations, and
they've-because we do share values. And they're universal values-they're not American
values or European values, they're universal values. And those values, being universal, ought
to be applied everywhere. And that's human rights, human dignity, rule of law, transparency
when it comes to government, decency. And, obviously, if the [European Union and the
United States] speak with one voice on these issues, it's more likely to hear-people will hear
it." Id.
298. BERMAN, supra note 283 (detailing the elements, both cultural and irrational, of
anti-American sentiment in Europe); see also SCHNABEL & ROCCA, supra note 17, at 89 (as-
serting that "the all-too-popular idea of Europe as Not-America undermines the relationship
between the [United States] and the [European Union] and gives a distorted image of Europe's
own character. Defining European identity in this way means exaggerating or overemphasiz-
ing the differences in values between Europe and America").
299. BERMAN, supra note 283, at xii (demonstrating how the process of post-Cold War
European unification has become defined by a broad-based irrational anti-American senti-
ment); Elaine Ganley, European Leaders Wary of Google's Digital Library, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIBUNE, May 6, 2005, at C5. The anti-Americanism of Europeans has also been
fodder for U.S. pundits who view U.S. defense guarantees of Europe as costly. See Robert
Bums, U.S. May Close Half of Its Bases in Europe, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 10, 2005, avail-
able at http://findarticles.comp/articles/mi-qn4188/is-20050510/ain 14620626 (reporting
that the Defense Department was planning the withdrawals of tens of thousands of U.S. troops
from Europe); see also Robert J. Samuelson, Modern Europe Withers on the Vine, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIBUNE, June 15, 2005, at B8 (declaring that "Europe is history's has-been. It isn't a
strong American ally, not simply because it disagrees with some U.S. policies, but also be-
cause it doesn't want to make the commitments required of a strong ally"); Craig S. Smith,
NATO Agrees to US. Proposals to Revamp Alliance, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2003, at A3.
300. Volmer, supra note 8 (announcing his interest in "strengthening all three sides of the
transatlantic triangle between Europe, Latin America, and North America" and his govern-
ment's intention of observing carefully and monitoring the creation of the pan-American free
trade zone, ALCA"); see also Matt Crenson, 2 Americans, German Share Nobel Prize for
Physics, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, Oct. 5, 2005, at A3.
301. SZABO, supra note 297, at 1 (explaining that the "German-American split was part
of a larger crisis in transatlantic relations that began with the end of the Cold War, increased
with the coming to power of the Bush administration, and erupted with ferocity in the fall of
2002 over the war in Iraq"). The installation of Conservative Angela Merkel as Germany's
first female Chancellor indicates that this split may have been but a brief interlude. David
McHugh, Germany Installs 1st Female Leader, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, Nov. 23, 2005,
at A15. On her first visit to the United States as German Chancellor, Angela Merkel took great
pains to heal the rifts with the Bush administration that plagued her predecessor's government,
particularly with respect to the invasion of Iraq. Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary,
President Welcomes German Chancellor Merkel to the White House, Jan. 13, 2006, available
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/0l/20060ll3-l.html; see also Angela's
Ashes, ECONOMIST, Oct. 7, 2006, at 13; Bush, Merkel United on Iran's Nuclear Threat,
CNN.coM, Jan. 13, 2006, http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/01/13/iran.nuclear/
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Such ideological competition may also apply with respect to U.S.
and E.U. approaches to legal reform in Latin America. The transition of
criminal procedures in Latin America may be one place to view this
phenomenon.02 For many decades, the U.S. legal system, with its rela-
tively transparent and fair criminal procedures, has been exported to
other countries as part of the overall democratic governance package that
USAID promoted.0 3 Likewise, foreign lawyers have looked to U.S. legal
institutions for credibility and pedigree.3 °0 The United States focused its
assistance in the area of prosecution of drug trafficking and other activi-
ties of organized crime through the Office of Overseas Prosecutorial
Development and Assistance and Training (OPDAT) 05
By the mid-1990s, however, the United States was no longer the
only player in rule of law assistance and "[t]he rule of law has become a
new rallying cry for global missionaries."' ' Once the Germans had en-
joyed success in reunifying East and West Germany after 1991, they too
looked abroad to spread their influence. With the successes of GTZ and
German academicians, German legal culture spread in Chile and other
Southern Cone countries. Outside of drug trafficking, the Germans have
been able to dominate the training of police officers, prosecutors, and the
authorities in charge of the prison system. Public defense work, however,
has been left to U.S. legal reform specialists. It is important to note that
index.html; Jim Hoagland, Merkel's Middle Way: Chancellor Charting New Role for Ger-
many, WASH. POST, Jan. 19, 2006, at A19 (discussing the new German Chancellor's quest to
"end three years of strained if not hostile relations between Washington and Berlin"). There
are, however, some hopes for renewed efforts at getting a European Constitution completed
and approved. Dan Bilefsky, German Leader Vows to Revive Constitution For Europe, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 18, 2007, at A3; Mark Landler, German Leader's Status Grows as Voice of
Europe, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2007, atA9.
302. MERRYMAN, supra note 6, at 124 (offering a discussion on the similarities between
substantive criminal law in developed, capitalist civil law countries and that in common law
countries, the same kinds of actions are considered criminal, and the same general approaches
to punishment are discussed and debated throughout Western culture).
303. KAGAN, supra note 13, at 37 (considering divergent U.S. and European views to-
ward international law and institutions and finding that "[t]he proof of the transcendent
importance of the American experiment would be found not only in the continual perfection of
American institutions at home but also in the spread of American influence in the world").
304. Bryant G. Garth & Yves Dezalay, Introduction, in GLOBAL PRESCRIPTIONS, supra
note 39, at 1, 1-2 (explaining that "[t]he consensus is furthered by the activities of policymak-
ers in the south who studied law in the United States as part of the first law and development
movement, and by numerous individuals from the south who now deem a U.S. degree indis-
pensable for a career in politics, the law, business, or the academy").
305. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance
and Training-Mission, http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/opdat/mission/mission.html (last vis-
ited Mar. 30, 2008).
306. Garth & Dezalay, supra note 304, at 1.
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in Germany, public defenders do not exist, meaning that U.S. influence
over anything more than their existence may be only by default.
The attraction of German legal models and law enforcement tech-
niques has to do with a social pact with industry, government, and
attorneys3°s that is more closely aligned to the "corporatist" models in
place in Chile and elsewhere in Latin America.0 It also has to do with
the post-war construction of Germany's rule of law, which incorporated
the best of European Community legal precepts and, outside of the Third
Reich's gangster State, a long history of legal tradition.30
Yet, it is probably incorrect to refer to Germany's legal culture as
homogenous."' Likewise, the competition that may exist between Ger-
man (or European) legal culture and U.S. legal culture is not so easily
defined. German legal culture is itself a milange of influences."' It may
be more accurate to refer to the German legal culture as a mixed system,
particularly in criminal procedure."' The German legal culture includes
some French customs and practices, 14 as well as some elements of
307. Germany does not have established public defenders, but the state has to provide an
attorney at law as a defender for an accused who does not have the financial resources to pay
for their own attorney. Strafprocel3ordnung [StPO] [Criminal Procedure Code] §§ 140(2), 141,
142(1) (F.R.G.).
308. See Dietrich Rueschemeyer, State, Capitalism, and the Organization of Legal Coun-
sel: Examining an Extreme Case-the Prussian Bar, 1700-1914, in LAWYERS AND THE RISE
OF WESTERN POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 52, 207 (discussing the long history of close
relations among attorneys, which were, in nineteenth-century Prussia, "a small and close-knit
group of civil servants"); see generally Kenneth F Ledford, Lawyers and the Limits of Liber-
alism: the German Bar in the Weimar Republic, in LAWYERS AND THE RISE OF WESTERN
POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 52, at 229.
309. HOWARD J. WIARDA, CORPORATISM AND COMPARATIVE POLITICS: THE OTHER
GREAT "ISM" 42 (1997).
310. Jean-Paul Jacqu6, The Role of Law in European Integration, in EUROPEAN LEGAL
CULTURES, supra note 19, at 501, 501 (discussing the role of the 1973 Declaration on Euro-
pean Identity in shaping the rule of law in the post-World War II Federal Republic of
Germany).
311. Dyson, supra note 25, at 392-95 (noting that German business culture is also mixed
and that "[o]ne of the most distinctive characteristics of post-war German business culture is
the combination of respect for a market economy with a strong corporatist outlook within
industry").
312. Rueschemeyer, supra note 308, at 227 (noting the long-running commitment of
lawyers in nineteenth century Prussia, and other German states, to liberal ideas).
313. Klaus Moritz, The Contribution of Honorary Judges to Labour Conflict Resolution
in Germany and France, in EUROPEAN LEGAL CULTURES, supra note 19, at 322, 327 (explain-
ing the German reorganization of the inquisitional process, which included the "introduction
of public oral proceedings, the creation of a public prosecutor's office and independence of the
judges ... reduc[ing] the need for exercising bourgeois control over the judicial system
through the use of jurors").
314. Halliday & Karpik, supra note 52, at 351 (noting the "imposition of the Napoleonic
Code[, which] was greeted as an emancipatory document by many-German principalities be-
cause it weakened local and traditional norms and instituted certain rights").
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Anglo-American influence.3 ' Moreover, as U.S. forces occupied Ger-
many for years after the Second World War and rebuilt Germany with the
Marshall Plan, the United States influenced the drafting of the German
Constitution after World War II as well.3 6
In the economic field, there may not be strict competition between
U.S. and European influences, but there may still exist small discrepan-
cies between technocrats, who argue over the benefits of European state-
interventionist policies, and those who subscribe to more U.S. free-
market principles.37 Others do not see the divergence concerning eco-
nomics at all, claiming that the mantra from London and Paris is like that
from Washington, D.C.38 Among "developed" legal cultures, the so-
called civilized nations3 9 show a trend toward legal convergence,3 20 as
evidenced by the priority that the World Bank and other international
agencies place on the rule of law. 2
Indeed, the competition between legal cultures such as that between
Europe and the United States generally may be overblown.322 It is too
simple to just speak of one legal culture having a monopoly on legal in-
fluence, 32 and there are areas of commonality shared by European (here,specifically German) and U.S. legal cultures. The protection of civil and
315. Helen Silving, Stare Decisis in the Civil and in the Common Law, in EUROPEAN
LEGAL CULTURES, supra note 19, at 141, 143.
316. The Allies (the United States, France, and Great Britain) instructed the German
Provisional Government to draft a constitution that included the requirements of the Allies.
Once completed, the draft was submitted to the Allies for their approval. See Gudrun Kruip,
Stimmen des 20 Jahrhunderts [Voices of the 20th Century] (Aug. 1998), available at http://
www.swbv.uni-konstanz.de/multimedia/mmarchiv/dra-cd41998_info.html.
317. Peter Hakim, The Uneasy Americas, 80 FOREIGN AFF. 46, 48 (2001) (noting that
"[allthough no American country has yet retreated from market economic policies as a result,
doubts have multiplied about the benefits of free trade and about the pace and breadth of the
economic reforms long advocated by Washington").
318. HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN
THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE 3 (2000) (finding that the advice from U.S. and
European leaders is much the same: "Stabilize your currencies, hang tough, ignore the food
riots, and wait patiently for the foreign investors to return").
319. See Statute for the International Court of Justice art. 38(l)(c), June 26, 1945, 59
Stat. 1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 993.
320. Friedman, supra note 37, at 73 (defining convergence as "a natural process, in so-
cieties that are moving along the same general paths").
321. Garth & Dezalay, supra note 304, at 2 (finding that a consensus has emerged among
policymakers and academics, and "national and multilateral agencies are investing much more
in the rule of law [today] than they did in the earlier period").
322. See SCHNABEL & ROCCA, supra note 17, at 89 (asserting that the differences be-
tween the United States and the European Union are exaggerated and overemphasized).
323. Kozolchyk, supra note 41, at xiii (noting the debt Latin American legal doctrine
owes to French, German, Italian, and U.S. sources); Nelken, supra note 36, at 32 (asserting
that "[gilobalization is unlikely to impose any one existing pattern of legal culture");
Wicacker, supra note 21, at 48 (reminding the reader that Europeans have no "monopoly on
legal culture").
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human rights is of paramount importance-something that both legal
cultures share.324 They share the primacy of contracts and that they
should be enforced.325 The presumption of innocence 326 is fundamental to
their developed legal systems, as is the right to legal representation.3 27 All
of this comes from the shared belief in the right to a fair trial 328 and is
grounded in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the Helsinki Final
Act.
329
It is through these shared values that much progress in terms of lay-
ing foundations for sustainable reform efforts can be built.33 No program
that exemplifies the three-way partnership is more pressing than the
Post-Graduate Diploma Program in the Rule of Law and Access to Jus-
tice (now called, in Spanish, Los nuevos desaflos del estado de derecho),
which brings together the legal cultures of Chile, Germany, and the
United States. 3 In the program, European legal culture is supplied by
GTZ, the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, and the Heidelberg Center for
Latin America.332 U.S. legal culture emanates from judges and policing
324. Compare GRUNDGESETZ FUR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GG] arts. 1-19
(F.R.G.) (federal constitution) (declaring "Grundrechte," or basic rights) [hereinafter
GRUNDGESETZ], with U.S. CONST. amends. I-VIII (same).
325. See, e.g., Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] [Civil Code] Aug. 1896, Reichsgesetzblatt
[RGB1] 195, as amended, § 145 (F.R.G.) (binding effects of offers).
326. See generally GRUNDGESETZ art. 20, as confirmed by Bundesverfassungsgericht
[BVerfG] [Constitutional Court] Dec. 15, 1965, 19 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts
[BVerfGE] 343 (F.R.G.). Also, a German district attorney has to search for proof that shows
that the accused is innocent. Strafprocellordnung [StPO] [Code of Criminal Procedure] Apr. 7,
1987, Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil I [BGB1. 11 1074, as amended, § 160(2) (ER.G.) [hereinafter
Strafprocel3ordnung].
327. See generally StrafproceBordnung, §§ 141-42.
328. See GRUNDGESETZ arts. 2, 20(111); see also BverfG, May 4, 2004, 110 BverfGE
339, available at http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/rs20040504lbvr189203.html.
329. Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Final Act, Aug. 1, 1975, 14
I.L.M. 1314 (Helsinki Final Act); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec.
16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71,
U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948).
330. Nelken, supra note 36, at 24 (noting that "[siome of the groups and individuals who
are involved in legal transfers work to a common purpose, as in the earlier [U.S.] 'law and
development' movement of the 1960s or the so-called 'Chicago Boys' combination of eco-
nomic realism and legal idealism. Others compete politically, socially, and professionally").
331. See generally Universidad de Chile, Los Nuevos Desaffos del Estado de Derecho
[New Challenges for the Rule of Law], http://www.derecho.uchile.cl/postgrado/diplomas/
estadoderecho reformas justicia_2006.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2008). In 2007, the pro-
gram was expanded to Paraguay. See Diplomado Internacional-El Estado de Derecho en el
Siglo XXI [International Diploma-The Rule of Law in the Twenty-First Century], http://
www.diplomadoestadodederecho.com/ (last visited Sept. 8, 2008).
332. See Press Release, Heidelberg Center for Latin America, Diplomado Intema-
cional-Los Nuevos Desaffos del Estado de Derecho [International Diploma-New
Challenges for the Rule of Law], available at http://www.heidelberg-center.uni-hd.de/
down/diplointer clausuraderecho.pdf (last visited Sept. 8, 2008).
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and constitutional experts of California Western School of Law.333 The
Chilean faculty members come from a broad swath of the leading aca-
demicians and practitioners in Chile as well. Since 2004, this trinational
postgraduate program has brought tools of analysis and some pedagogy
to the exercise of legal reform through lectures and workshops for Chil-
ean legal professionals, diplomats, politicians, and journalists, all related
to legal areas subject to the reform process.334 The opinions and ap-
proaches represented from these three distinct legal cultures are richly
diverse, yet all share the objective of exploring the best methodologies to
solve modernity's most pressing societal ills. 35 A fourth legal culture,
perhaps a synthesis of legal cultures, may develop in time.
VI. CONCLUSION: THE ETHICS OF LEGAL TRANSPLANTATION
Regardless, however, of the competition among legal cultures, the
very ethics of legal transplantation should be re-examined. 337 At times,
access to the resources of foreign governments, aid agencies, and
333. See Press Release, Heidelberg Center for Latin America, Three Countries Launch
Comparative Law Post-Graduate Diploma (June 2, 2003), available at http://www.rzuser.uni-
hd.de/-pO0/english/pressescondor210504.html.
334. Chileans too are increasingly involved in legal reform projects in other States in the
region. They have undertaken judicial reform assistance in Costa Rica, the Dominican Repub-
lic, Panama, and Peru. Given Chile's success in implementing the criminal procedure reform
in a few short years, Chilean lawyers, judges, and legal educators are much in demand else-
where in Latin America, consulting for ministries of justice eager to repeat Chile's successful
implementation of criminal procedure reforms. See Abogados Creativos Colaborando para
Encontrar Soluciones Optimas [ACCESO], ACCESO Director Lectures at CEDEP in
Asuncion, Paraguay for Post-Graduate Program Closing, http://proyectoacceso.com/web/
guest/news/cedep (last visited Oct. 9, 2008) (describing how the University of Chile and Cali-
foria Western School of Law worked together to reform the rule of law in Chile and now are
expanding to Paraguay); see also CALPC & CEPECAL, Taller de Abogacfa Oral "Destrezas
en un Juicio Oral," http://www.calpc.net/pagprincipal.htm (last visited Oct. 13, 2008); Defen-
soria, Ponencia de la Defensoria Obtiene Primer Lugar en X Congreso Latinoamericano de
Auditorfa (Aug. 28, 2007), http://www.defensoriapenal.clinterior/noticias/dpp.php?id=3525
(last visited Oct. 13, 2008); Defensoria, Representante de la Corte Suprema de Panam6 visit6
la Defensorfa (Aug. 14, 2007), http://www.defensoriapenal.cl/interior/noticias/dpp.php?id=
3500 (last visited Oct. 13, 2008); Defensorfa, Estudiantes de Derecho Darin a Conocer Labor
de la Defensoria en el XX Congreso Latinoamericano de Derecho Penal y Criminologia (Sept.
11, 2008), http://www.defensoriapenal.cl/interior/noticias/dpp.php?id=4171 (last visited Oct.
13, 2008).
335. See EL ESTADO DE DERECHO Y LA REFORMAS A LA JUSTICIA [THE STATE OF LAW
AND JUSTICE REFORMS] (James Cooper et al. eds., 2004).
336. AGUSTfN GORDILLo, THE FUTURE OF LATIN AMERICA: CAN THE EU HELP? 23-24
(2003) (hoping for "a convergence of civilizations in Latin America, with the help of Europe
and the United States; a new culture emerging that improves what we now have in Latin
America. Not a new European-(North) American civilization, but a new culture emerging in
Latin America with some influence from those kinds of civilization" (emphasis in original)).
337. Nelken, supra note 36, at 35.
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foundations can assist in the internal power struggles over policy
directions. Legal reforms have indeed been used to further political
gain.339 In addition, there are pressing issues concerning the amount of
local knowledge to be integrated and the degree to which foreign
influence should be permitted at all.340 Peruvian sociologist Hernando de
Soto agrees: "[C]reating an integrated system is not about drafting laws
and regulations that look good on paper but rather about designing
norms that are rooted in people's beliefs and are thus more likely to be
obeyed and enforced. 34' Professor Dani Rodrik provides empirical
support for his argument that a well-designed strategy for institution
building should take into account "local knowledge" and should not
"over-emphasize best-practice 'blueprints'' observed in developed
countries at the expense of local participation and experimentation.3 2
Indeed, "for the law to be effective, it must be meaningful in the context
in which it is applied so citizens have an incentive to use the law and to
demand institutions that work to enforce and develop the law."
343
338. See DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 5, at 7 (finding that "[f]oreign expertise is used
... to fight against opponents for control over state power").
339. See BUSCAGLIA, DAKOLIAS & RATLIFF, supra note 65. The authors explain that
[m]any of the legal reforms carried out in Latin American history had nothing to do
with a domestic will to improve the nation but were rather the result of the conver-
gence of international pressures on dominant domestic groups and the latter's
decisions to do what they calculated was in their own private, family, and group in-
terests. For example, in the past institutions have been transplanted from the United
States or Europe or both because of the weight of international influence and pres-
tige."
Id. at 17.
340. Cotterrell, supra note 28, at 79 (describing a legal transplant as successful only if "it
proves consistent with these matters of culture in the recipient environment or reshapes them
in conformity with the cultural pre-suppositions of the transplanted law").
341. DE SOTO, supra note 318, at 159.
342. Dani Rodick, Institutions for High-Quality Growth: What They Are and How to
Acquire Them, 35 STUD. COMP. INT'L DEv. 3 (2000); see also Javier Alcalde, Differential
hnpact of American Political and Economic Institutions on Latin America, in THE U.S. CON-
STITUTION AND THE CONSTITUTIONS OF LATIN AMERICA, supra note 105, at 97, 105-06
(finding problems in Latin America, where "imported laws from France and from the United
States ... were really inapplicable[, it was) ... impossible to apply these laws to the social
context, [and] easier for the bureaucracy and for the people not to observe these laws and to
ignore them").
343. Berkowitz, Pistor & Richard, supra note 64, at 167. But see William Ewald, Com-
parative Jurisprudence (I1): The Logic of Legal Transplants, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 489, 490
(1995) (undermining the theory that law depends on the context in which it is implemented
and thus suggesting that the "legal rules can be transported from society to society .... ");
Reed Brody, International Aspects of Current Efforts at Judicial Reform: Undermining Justice
in Haiti, in THE (UN)RULE OF LAW & THE UNDERPRIVILEGED IN LATIN AMERICA, supra note
77, at 227, 227 (asserting that, although this principle is often ignored by those assisting the
reform, "[i]ntemational assistance to judicial reform, like all international development assis-
tance, must be shaped by those who will be most immediately affected"); see also Gunther
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The wholesale adoption of foreign models can mean the abdication
of responsibility by local stakeholders, lackluster support for reforms,
and lack of ownership in, or even resistance to, institutional change. 3'
Toward the end of his term in office, Chilean President Ricardo Lagos
wrote, "We often copy only the accessories, fashion, and the customs,
without changing how we face the world, how we create or produce.
Many times do we fail while walking at the same pace as the world's
conscience, the objectives and principles of which have deepen through-
out the years. 345
This may be why, across the Western Hemisphere, major challenges
remain for the judicial sector.346 There is also the issue of sequencing-
the order in which reforms have been promulgated. 347 The early focus on
privatization and deregulation schemes as part of the economic reforms
Teubner, Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law Ends Up in New
Divergences, 61 MOD. L. REV. 11 (1998).
344. Nelken, supra note 36, at 35-36 (measuring a successful legal transplant by its
complete acceptance into the "legal and political culture which has imported it"); see Fried-
man, supra note 37, at 71-72 (noting that the weakness of "[h]armonization and model law-
making," is that they "work only through persuasion; there is no political force capable of
imposing models on States").
345. RICARDO LAGOS ESCOBAR, LA DEMOCRACIA EN AMfRICA LATINA: HACIA UNA DE-
MOCRACIA DE CIUDADANAS Y CIUDADANOS [DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA: TOWARDS A
CITIZENS' DEMOCRACY] 10 (2004) ("Muchas veces copiamos s6lo lo accesorio, la moda y las
costumbres, sin cambiar nuestra manera de pararnos frente al mundo, de crear, de producir.
Fallamos muchas veces en caminar al mismo paso que la conciencia del mundo, cuyos objeti-
vos y principios se han profundizado a lo largo de los afios.").
346. Jorge L. Esquirol, Continuing Fictions of Latin American Law, 55 FLA. L. REV. 41
(2003). The continued problems include the limited independence of the judicial power, inef-
ficient allocation of resources to operate the system causing backlogs in the administration of
cases, and providing an opening for corruption, cumbersome legal procedures, inadequate
management of courthouses, and legal cases, deficient policies for selection and training of
personnel, quasi impunity or feeble sanctions to anti-ethical conduct, and the limited scope of
alternative dispute resolution and access mechanisms for low-income sectors and minority
groups. Fuentes-Hernndez, supra note 89, at 44 (proposing that legal education in Latin
America be redesigned to include an interdisciplinary curriculum educating law students in
the values of democracy and on practical methods for how to contribute to the region's social
and economic development).
347. Timing has been a constant issue concerning development assistance from the de-
veloped world. See, e.g., Jeffrey D. Sachs, Russia's Struggle with Stabilization: Conceptual
Issues and Evidence, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE WORLD BANK ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON DE-
VELOPMENT ECONOMICS (Michael Bruno & Boris Pleskovic eds., 1995). For Professor Sachs,
the sequencing of reforms is of utmost importance:
Many discussions of economic reform, and of Western economic assistance to Russia,
do not take adequate account of the financial, political, and administrative weaknesses
of the new Russian state. Many reform strategies would have the state undertake sub-
tle and complex duties even when it is unable to fulfill much simpler and basic tasks
.... If the weaknesses of the Russian state are understood more clearly, the appropri-
ate roles and timing of Western assistance are put in a more helpful light.
Id. at 14.
Spring 2008]
Michigan Journal of International Law
were undertaken before legal reform efforts had been started, let alone
completed. The result was the wholesale looting of national treasuries as
state assets were sold off in corrupt regulation and bidding processes.
The better approach is to first build the institutions that maintain the rule
of law and then focus on undertaking economic deregulation and privati-
zation to open markets, with watchdog organizations and independent
judiciaries to monitor these processes.
The reforms required by the Washington Consensus have been im-
plemented in many parts of Latin America, often resulting in economic
hardship for the working class.3 4' That the United States pushed this de-
velopment agenda has injured its credibility among the policy-making
elite and its popularity among the masses.3"9 While economic growth did
result in some cases, it came at a large expense for the lower socio-
348. REID, supra note 7 (discussing how the Washington Consensus and the policies of
the International Monetary Fund in Latin America "led to an increase in poverty, inequality,
unemployment and the informal economy across the region," and how "through privatisa-
tion and free trade they enriched a few at the expense of the many ... "); Luis Reygadas,
Latin America: Persistent Inequality and Recent Transformations, in LATIN AMERICA AF-
TER NEOLIBERALISM: TURNING THE TIDE IN THE 21ST CENTURY? 126 (Eric Hershberg &
Fred Rosen eds., 2006) ("During the 1990s, average incomes increased, but these improve-
ments were unequally distributed: the income of employers rose from 25 times the poverty
rate to 34 times that figure, whereas that of workers rose only from 3.5 to 4.3 times the
poverty rate." (citing Alejandro Portes & Kelly Hoffman, Latin American Class Structures:
Their Composition and Change During the Neoliberal Era, 38 LATIN AM. RES. REV. 41, 55
(2003))). Latin America has greater income inequality than any other region in the world.
Moreover, the richest people of Latin America receive a "far higher proportion of [their
country's] income than their counterparts elsewhere in the world." Id. at 120-22; cf Press
Release, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, Latin America and
the Caribbean Continues to Grow, in Spite of Deteriorating International Economic
Context (Aug. 27, 2008), available at http://www.eclac.org/cgi-bin/getProd.asp?xml=/prensa/
noticias/comunicados/0/33890/P33890.xml&xsl=/prensa/tpi-i/p6f.xsl&base=/tp-i/top-bottom.xsI
(discussing how GDP, labor markets, and poverty rates have improved throughout Latin
America since 2002, but also estimating that because of volatility, uncertainty, rising infla-
tion, and other factors the economic growth of the region would slow down in 2009).
According to a recent poll undertaken by The Economist and Latinbar6metro, a Chilean
polling organization, only a bare majority of Latin Americans remain committed to democ-
racy. The Stubborn Survival of Frustrated Democrats, ECONOMIST, Nov. 1, 2003, at 18. In
2004, a survey of citizens in Latin American States showed that approximately fifty-five per-
cent of the people supported the return of some form of authoritarian regime, clearly signaling
the distrust held of current governing practices and the return to democracy experiences
throughout the region. Hector Tobar, Latin America Losing Faith in Democracy, L.A. TIMES,
Apr. 22, 2004, at A3.
349. Jeremy Adelman & Miguel Angel Centeno, Between Liberalism and Neoliberalism:
Law's Dilemma in Latin America, in GLOBAL PRESCRIPTIONS, supra note 39, at 139, 140
(finding the roots of the "current malaise" in the record of "liberalism in Latin America. The
combination of market economics and republican rule, far from delivering on their upbeat
prophecies, has usually resulted in polarized extremes: social upheaval against market rules or
praetorian brutality").
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economic classes, many of whom are from indigenous communities.5
The reforms of the mid-1990s failed to reduce poverty, marginalized the
already impoverished working classes, and reduced government-
provided social benefits as part of the austerity measures mandated by
the International Monetary Fund and other financial institutions. 5'
The failure for the benefits of globalization to be spread throughout
the various socio-economic classes in Latin America has forced scholars,
international aid agencies, and donor financial institutions to rethink the
role that law can play in the development process.352 Professors Erik Jen-
sen and Thomas Heller, in a collection of essays, conclude that efforts to
strengthen the rule of law have been channeled inefficiently, due to the
questionable incentives facing domestic and international reformers and
a lack of concrete information concerning methods to strengthen legal
systems. 353 Jensen and Heller decry the "the field-of-dreams approach" of
international aid agencies. The authors rightly wonder whether anything
more than new courtroom buildings and self-congratulatory praise from
aid agencies have resulted.M
Indeed, the globalization of law and the infrastructure to secure capi-
tal markets have meant the primacy of international business law and
350. GORDILLO, supra note 336, at 31 (arguing that "magical improvement" without
"outside managerial" help is unlikely).
351. DE SOTO, supra note 318, at 3 (noting that while foreign investment, stable curren-
cies, free trade, transparent banking practices, and the privatization of state-owned industries
are desirable, "we continually forget that global capitalism has been tried before. In Latin
America, for example, reforms directed at creating capitalist systems have been tried at least
four times since independence from Spain in the 1820s. Each time, after the initial euphoria,
Latin Americans swung back from capitalist and market economy policies"); see generally
JOHN RAPLEY, GLOBALIZATION AND INEQUALITY: NEOLIBERALISM's DOWNWARD SPIRAL
(2004) (showing that while neoliberal reforms did generate economic growth, this growth has
also resulted in negative consequences such as increases in inequality, political instability,
right-wing populism, and ethnic and Islamic militancy).
352. Cf GARDNER, supra note 52, at 3 (noting that "American legal assistance to the
developing world has not been carefully and comprehensively studied .... Nor have those
matters been carefully explored by scholars interested in the role of lawyers and the rule of
law in Latin America and the Third World").
353. Erik G. Jensen & Thomas C. Heller, Introduction, in BEYOND COMMON KNOWL-
EDGE: EMPIRICAL APPROACHES TO THE RULE OF LAW 2 (Erik G. Jensen & Thomas C. Heller
eds., 2003) (questioning whether the resources poured into rule of law projects are well spent).
354. Linn Hammergren, International Assistance to Latin American Justice Programs:
Toward an Agenda for Reforming the Reformers, in BEYOND COMMON KNOWLEDGE, supra
note 353, at 319-20; see also GARDNER, supra note 52, at 9. Gardner stated that
American lawyers were often poorly equipped for the tasks undertaken. Knowing
relatively little of the Third World, they were all the more predisposed to rely on
what they did know: American legal culture. As a result American legal assistance
was inept, culturally unaware, and sociologically uninformed. It was also ethnocen-
tric, perceiving and assisting the Third World in its own self-image.
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U.S. approaches to business law. 55 As Professor Lynn Stout has de-
scribed, "it is a tempting prospect to think that, by modifying their rules
to more closely approximate U.S.-style corporate law, such nations
might spur the process of economic development. 356 This has meant that
private law and the structure of rules for the free market become para-
mount and a legislative priority for governments. Public law, which
involves civil rights and the general welfare of society, is of secondary
importance. This prescription was designed so that a more secure, pre-
dictable, and efficient legal system will first increase economic growth
357
and then lead to democratic governance.
This sequence of events, however, has generally not occurred: "One
view is that U.S.-inspired institutions have not worked in Latin America
at all. ' 35 8 U.S. legal culture is fraught with challenges.3 59 On the other
hand, German legal culture, representing the European ideal, has become
a viable and credible source from which to borrow.3' 6 The exportation of
German legal culture has been more focused on the development of pub-
lic law rather than private or business-centric regulation. Since the
reunification of Germany, the German government has been able to ex-
port much of its legal culture abroad. German ideas and leadership
continue to dominate Europe and are increasing in importance around
the globe. In January 2007, German Chancellor Angela Merkel was in-
vited to address the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, not
355. For Ronald Wolf, economic liberalism, as evidenced by lex mercatoria, has pushed
a new world commercial legal order, also affecting civil rights. See RONALD CHARLES WOLF,
TRADE, AID AND ARBITRATE: THE GLOBALIZATION OF WESTERN LAW 11 (2003) (maintaining
that the philosophies of present international institutional organizations, coupled with the
fundamentals of international arbitration, have weakened national sovereignty over interna-
tional trade issues).
356. Lynn A. Stout, On the Export of U.S.-Style Corporate Fiduciary Duties to Other
Cultures: Can a Transplant Take? 2 (UCLA School of Law, Working Paper No. 02-11, May
21, 2002), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=313679.
357. CAROTHERS, supra note 19, at 164; see HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH
159-60 (1990); Hernando de Soto, Protection of Property Rights and Civil Society, in JUSTICE
DELAYED: JUDICIAL REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA 73 (Edmundo Jarqufn & Fernando Carrillo
eds., 1998) (discussing property title reforms in Peru); Richard A. Posner, Creating a Legal
Framework for Economic Development, 13 WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER 1, 2-3 (1998).
358. Alcalde, supra note 342, at 99.
359. See .KAGAN, supra note 34, at 126-44; STEPHEN D. SUGARMAN, DOING AWAY WITH
PERSONAL INJURY LAW: NEW COMPENSATION MECHANISMS FOR VICTIMS, CONSUMERS, AND
BUSINESS (1989); see also William H. Simon, Solving Problems vs. Claiming Rights: The
Pragmatist Challenge to Legal Liberalism, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 127 (2004) (exploring
developments in public interest lawyering).
360. Cf Carter Dougherty, Germany Battling Rising ide of Corporate Corruption, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 15, 2007, at Cl; Mike Esterl & David Crawford, In Bribe Probe, Siemens Ex-
Staffer Cites Payment, WALL ST. J., Feb. 8, 2007, at Al 1.
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U.S. President George W. Bush.36' It may be that the competition under-
way in Chile is part of a bigger trend of the waning U.S. influence on
legal cultures and policy decisions elsewhere.
361. Mark Landler, Reworking the A-List: Those Invited to Davis Reflect This Year's
Theme of a Shift in Power, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2007, at CI.
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